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THE PHILOSOPHY AND JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICE
ROBERTS
Kiel Brennan-Marquez*
Abstract
A thicket of commentary has blossomed around the figure of Chief
Justice Roberts. The bulk of it, however, has either focused exclusively
on his role in the 2011 term or has lumped him in uncritically with the
Court’s conservative wing. In response, this Article takes a wider view of
his tenure, arguing that Chief Justice Roberts is best understood as an
idealist, a true believer in the rule of law, with a special sensitivity
toward issues of constitutional structure. In the first Part of the Article, I
explore Chief Justice Roberts’s penchant for infusing his opinions with
“teaching moments”—a tendency certainly on display in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 1 (NFIB), but discernable
in many other opinions as well. In the second Part, I revisit Chief Justice
Roberts’s much-maligned umpire metaphor. Commentators have unfairly
caricatured the metaphor as right-wing wordplay. I argue, by contrast,
that the metaphor conveys the same constitutional philosophy as his
teaching moments: one in which law is dialectically structured,
simultaneously limited and limiting, and it is precisely because of law’s
limitations that judges stand on legitimate ground when setting the limits
of state action. With this formal picture of judging established, the final
Part asks how Chief Justice Roberts’s theory of constitutional judging
maps onto his actual jurisprudence. Although Chief Justice Roberts is
certainly a judicial conservative—and emphatically not a swing vote—I
argue that he does have a notable “federalist streak.” NFIB is certainly
one example of this, but a better example is Arizona v. United States 2 in
which Chief Justice Roberts banded with the Court’s liberals to outline
an expansive vision of federal immigration power. I close by highlighting
a few other instances of Chief Justice Roberts’s “federalist streak” and
by suggesting that they flow from his sensitivity toward constitutional
structure, as outlined in the first two Parts.

* © 2014 Kiel Brennan-Marquez. Resident Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale
Law School; J.D., Yale Law School, 2011. My gratitude to Linda Greenhouse, who
inspired this project in the first instance, and to the students who patiently indulged—and
propelled—our exploration of “judicial personalities” during the Fall of 2012. Many
thanks, as well, to the editors of the Utah Law Review. The Article has been much
improved for their efforts.
1
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
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Law has its limits. 3
INTRODUCTION
What a difference a year can make. In June 2012, with NFIB fresh off the
press, commentary began to unfurl around Chief Justice Roberts. Some called him
a traitor, 4 others, a pragmatist. 5 Perhaps—we thought to ourselves—this is not the
conservative we thought we knew. 6 But the tenor of this thought was cautious,
bemused. For the true motivations of Chief Justice Roberts—the Court’s second
youngest Justice, but also its elusive leader—bore the transparency of a sphinx’s
grin.
Flash forward to June 2013: at the close of a term that will surely be tallied
among the most historic of his tenure, discussion of Chief Justice Roberts once
again began to crackle. But there was no such mystique as the year before.7 Gay

3

CSX Transp. Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2652 (2011) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
4
See, e.g., John Yoo, Chief Justice Roberts and His Apologists, WALL ST. J., June 30,
2012, at A15 (calling Chief Justice Roberts an unfit model for whom a Republican
President should appoint); Clint Bolick, The Supreme Court Stakes in 2012, WALL ST. J.
(July 9, 2012, 7:48 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230414120
4577509250108648814 (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts is not a “solid conservative”
and that he might even be the new “swing justice”).
5
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Is It The Roberts Court?, in THE HEALTHCARE CASE:
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 186, 188–89 (Nathaniel Persily et
al. eds., 2013) (suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts was partly motivated in NFIB by the
practical exigencies of his role as Chief, rather than Associate, Justice); Wilson Huhn,
Realism Over Formalism and the Presumption of Constitutionality: Chief Justice Roberts’
Opinion Upholding the Individual Mandate, 46 AKRON L. REV. 117 (2013) (presenting the
NFIB opinion as a “realist” concession to congressional power and to political reality). Cf.
Erwin Chemerinsky, It’s Now the Roberts Court, 15 GREEN BAG 2D 389 (2012) (arguing
that Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in NFIB manifested pragmatism in spite of his
generally ideological commitments).
6
Some have argued that a new era of constitutional law—the “Roberts Court”—has
dawned. See generally, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 5. Cf. Adam Liptak, Roberts Shows
Deft Hand as Swing Vote on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, at A1 (suggesting
that NFIB underscored the power of “the Chief Justice’s leadership”). Others, maintaining
that the Chief Justice’s words echoed something of Chief Justice Marshall’s legendary
finesse from Marbury v. Madison, have predicted that it will be his background Commerce
Clause holding, not his vindication of Affordable Care Act on other grounds, that would
ultimately define his—and the case’s—legacy. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, We Lost on Health
Care. But the Constitution Won, WASH. POST, July 1, 2012, at B1 (calling NFIB a victory
from the vantage point of constitutional structure).
7
Compare Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES, (July 11,
2012, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/the-mystery-of-john-rob
erts/ [hereinafter Mystery], with Linda Greenhouse, The Real John Roberts Emerges, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2013, at SR1.
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marriage, 8 affirmative action, 9 voting rights: 10 by all accounts, the mask was off.
And so we arrived back where we stood before the NFIB rigmarole, when two
digestible snapshots of the Chief Justice were on offer, their silhouettes perfectly
clear. Chief Justice Roberts: the straight-laced conservative. 11 And Chief Justice
Roberts: the backroom operator, ever so sly. 12
8

See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696–97 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Defense of Marriage Act should have been held constitutional
under rational basis and that, in any event, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
certiorari appeal).
9
Although the Fisher Court did not end up issuing much in the way of an opinion on
affirmative action—opting, instead, to kick the issue back to the Fifth Circuit, see Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421–22 (2013)—the Fisher arguments
nonetheless stand as a testament to how fervently the Chief Justice frowns upon raceconscious laws. Usually a model of composure during oral argument, he joined Justice
Scalia in essentially sandbagging Greg Garre’s argument for the University of Texas with
irrelevant and elliptical questions. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–40, Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (“Counsel, before—I need to
figure out exactly what these numbers mean. Should someone who is one-quarter Hispanic
check the Hispanic box or some different box?”).
10
See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for the Court, holding section 4 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional).
11
At a descriptive level, the attempt to lump Chief Justice Roberts in with the Court’s
other conservatives finds support on both sides of the aisle. For an example of conservative
accounts that group Chief Justice Roberts in with the rest of the judicial right, see Douglas
W. Kmiec, Overview of the Term: The Rule of Law and Roberts’s Revolution of Restraint,
34 PEPP. L. REV. 495, 496 (2007) (arguing that the conservative wing of the Roberts Court
is defined by “humility, unanimity, and fidelity to the written law”); see also Henry T.
Scott, Burkean Minimalism and the Roberts Court’s Docket, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
753, 754, 760 (2008) (arguing that the conservative wing of the Court has demonstrated an
interest in judicial minimalism with respect to cases involving “business interests”).
For examples of liberal commentators who view Chief Justice Roberts in a similar
light (but, as expected, take a very different normative view), see generally Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947 (2008) (discussing
the four conservative Justices as a group, noting the themes of ideological harmony among
them, and picking out Justice Kennedy as the Court’s main distinctive voice); Steven L.
Winter, John Roberts’s Formalist Nightmare, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 549, 555 (2009)
(describing the Chief Justice as a “formalist” and using Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), to argue that Chief Justice Roberts’s
“formalism” has the effect of “deform[ing] his critical capacities”).
12
See generally Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time
Bombs, and Inadvertance: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779
(2012) (exploring the ways in which the Roberts Court, and especially the Chief Justice
himself, has used an intricate web of “invitations,” and other signaling devices, to tee up
future litigations); see also JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND
THE SUPREME COURT 295 (2012) (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts is driven, first and
foremost, by an agenda for which he is willing to steer outcomes behind the scenes). On the
whole, Toobin is very comfortable applying monikers customarily associated with
bureaucrats and politicians to the Chief Justice (for example, referring to his opinion in
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The trouble with this story—or, I should say, these many stories—is how little
attention they have paid to the actual record. Yes, Chief Justice Roberts is
unquestionably a judicial conservative. And yes, his institutional hand is deft
beyond dispute. But we have allowed the most prominent trees, ravishing as they
are, to distract us from the larger forest. This Article responds by taking the
opposite tack. In what follows, I comb back through eight terms’ worth of Chief
Justice Roberts’s handiwork in search of broader jurisprudential trends.
This effort yields a rather different portrait of the Chief Justice than previous
commentary has managed. It is the portrait of an idealist, a true believer in the rule
of law, with a constitutional philosophy defined by overlapping, mutually
constitutive visions of constraint: on the one hand, the way judges constrain
political branches by enforcing constitutional limits; on the other, the way that law,
as a “system of rules,” 13 constrains the power of judges. In Chief Justice Roberts’s
view, I argue, the judiciary stands on legitimate ground to constrain other state
actors only because its enterprise—law—is in the first place constrained. It is
because the rule of law is limited that it can remain the rule of law. This
constitutional philosophy is certainly not new. 14 Nor is it necessarily correct. My
aim is not to defend Chief Justice Roberts’s constitutional philosophy on the
merits. My aim is instead to suggest that his philosophy differs, in both formal
composition and practical implication, from the caricatures that have emerged thus
far.
The Article is tripartite. Part I explores Chief Justice Roberts’s penchant for
infusing his opinions with “teaching moments.” These are divisible into two
strands. One strand emphasizes the structural principles that empower the judiciary
to constrain the latitude of political branches. The second strand emphasizes the
boundaries that separate law from the larger normative world, thereby constraining
the scope of the judicial function. In tandem, these lessons sketch a nuanced,
dialectical theory of judging, one in which the judiciary, as guardian of law’s rule,
is at once an agent and an object of constraint.
Part II suggests that this conception of judging maps elegantly on to Chief
Justice Roberts’s widely derided umpire metaphor—an image that commentators
NFIB as “strategic genius”). Id. at 295; see also Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited, THE
NEW YORKER, May 21, 2012, at 36 (arguing that the Chief Justice engineered the rehearing
of Citizens United).
13
See Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2549 (2010) (noting that adverse
consequences are the “unavoidable result of having a system of rules”).
14
In fact, it reaches back to the very origins of our constitutional system, to Chief
Justice Marshall and Marbury v. Madison, two of Chief Justice Roberts’s favorite sources
of inspiration. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1807) (describing the
American constitutional system as “a government of laws, not of men”); see also Jeffrey
Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.theatlantic.com/mag
azine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559/?single_page=true (recounting an interview
comparing Chief Justice Roberts to Chief Justice Marshall and recounting an interview in
which Chief Justice Roberts spoke at length about his reverence for Chief Justice
Marshall).
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have misconstrued, in my view, by roughly 180 degrees. I argue that dominant
interpretations of the metaphor—understanding it to codify an anemic, reactionary
view of judging 15—pluck Chief Justice Roberts’s words out of context and, in
doing so, fail to appreciate the full arc of his remarks before the Senate Judicial
Committee. 16 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts conjured the umpire image to tell a
larger story about the hallowed role that judges play in safeguarding the rule of
law. The resultant theory of judging is dialectical in the same manner suggested by
his teaching lessons: although judicial power is constrained—the judge, as umpire,
is emphatically not a player—it also acts to constrain. And for Chief Justice
Roberts, the latter aspect of judging predominates over the former. His theory is
one of judicial supremacy, not judicial minimization.
With these snapshots in tow, Part III turns to the Chief Justice’s
jurisprudence, exploring what difference his abstract sensitivity to the boundaries
and structure of law makes in practice. After setting out a number of Chief Justice
Roberts’s foundationally conservative viewpoints, I close by highlighting two
aspects of his jurisprudence that, in my view, best reflect his constitutional
idealism. The first is that he has a notable, and notably intricate, “federalist streak.”
His NFIB opinion is certainly one example. A better example, however, is Arizona
v. United States, which was largely overshadowed by NFIB, but whose result is in
many ways more remarkable. In Arizona, the Chief Justice forged a coalition with
the Court’s liberals to outline an expansive, principled vision of federal dominion
over immigration. This decision harmonizes, I argue, with past instances when
Chief Justice Roberts has swerved to the defense of federal power, to the lasting
dismay of his conservative colleagues. The second aspect of Chief Justice
Roberts’s jurisprudence worth noting is an attribute whose presence is as
enlivening as its rarity is grim: approaching difficult cases as a lawyer, not a
partisan. In cases that present extreme or idiosyncratic facts, Chief Justice Roberts

15

See Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U.
L. REV. 1049, 1050–55 (2006); see also Theodore A. McKee, Judges as Umpires, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709, 1710–11 (2007); Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration
and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 702–12 (2007); Vaughn R. Walker, Moving
the Strike Zone: How Judges Sometimes Make Law, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1210–11
(2012); Kim M. Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons from Judge Cardozo,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1629, 1644 (2010); Aaron S. J. Zelinsky, The Justice as
Commissioner: Bunching the Judge-Umpire Analogy, 119 YALE L. J. ONLINE 113, 114–17
(2010). But see Michael P. Allen, A Limited Defense of (at Least Some of) the Umpire
Analogy, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525, 527 (2009); William H. Pryor Jr., The Perspective of
a Junior Circuit Judge on Judicial Modesty, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1007, 1009–14 (2008)
(praising the umpire metaphor as a defense of judicial restraint).
16
Interestingly, Charles Fried has recently published an essay along similar lines,
attempting to recontextualize the umpire metaphor. In my view, however, his
recontextualization focuses on the wrong part of the context. See Charles Fried, Balls and
Strikes, 61 EMORY L. REV. 641, 642 (putting Chief Justice Roberts’s well-known quip
about “calling balls and strikes” in conversation with his commitment to approaching cases
without an agenda).
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is willing to break rank from the conservative bloc, inspiring him to agree, on
narrow grounds, with outcomes that run counter to his general commitments.
In one sense, it might seem strange—given the scholarly forum—to take
seriously how Chief Justice Roberts represents his approach to judging (in the first
two Parts), quite apart from how he actually judges (in the third). The former might
be described, charitably, as mere rhetoric, and less charitably, as eloquent lies. But
my effort here is deliberate, for the Article’s ambitions are as much appreciative as
they are analytical. In fact, I am skeptical that the two can be kept distinct. It is
only by adopting an internal viewpoint, which requires some measure of
appreciation, that Chief Justice Roberts’s orientation toward his own post can be
properly grasped. In this sense, my hope is that the two halves of the Article,
though seemingly disconnected, will, over its full course, dissolve into one.
I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS
The Chief Justice has a penchant for suffusing his opinions with two distinct,
but complementary, teaching moments. Both educate the reader about the shape of
our legal order. But they differ in their approach to that enterprise. The first batch
of lessons traces law’s inner striations. They help acquaint the reader with the
complicated distributions of power and authority that comprise our constitutional
system. Chief Justice Roberts’s exhortation of federal structure from the NFIB
opinion hails from this category. But so do some of Roberts’s lesser-known
opinions. In what follows, I profile three examples (in addition to NFIB): two of
his opinions for the Court (Stern v. Marshall 17 and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Co. Accounting Board 18) and one concurrence (in Citizens United v. FEC 19).
The second batch of lessons explores the external boundaries that separate law
from the rest of the normative world. Hallmark examples include Snyder v.
Phelps, 20 Miller v. Alabama, 21 and Boumediene v. Bush, 22 although these are
plucked from an innumerable many. Chief Justice Roberts, it turns out, is very
fond of punctuating his opinions with meditations about law’s limitations. These
lessons take a more cautionary form. The proposition they enunciate—that even
when law works perfectly, there are many things it cannot accomplish, many
tradeoffs it cannot overcome—is not always an easy thing to countenance. But for
the sake of understanding our constitutional world, Chief Justice Roberts seems to
say, it must be confronted.
What both sets of lessons have in common is their formal character. The
lessons are not unrelated, of course, to the substantive conclusions that Chief
Justice Roberts draws in each case. But neither do they determine those
conclusions as a matter of law or logic. In this sense, the lessons occupy an
17

131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
19
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
20
131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
21
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
22
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
18
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unusual gray space between holding and dictum: they communicate something
enduring about Chief Justice Roberts’s conception of judging, and they underscore
his broader constitutional sensibilities. 23 Even if they are marginal to the particular
holdings in each case, they are anything but marginal to the deeper jurisprudential
orientation that informs those holdings. And in this respect, the lessons cast light
on Chief Justice Roberts’s broader propensities as a jurist.
A. Law’s Inner Striations
“In our federal system, the National Government possesses only limited
powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.”24 So begins the Chief
Justice’s exhortation of constitutional structure in NFIB. The opinion continues
this way, outlining elementary distinctions, for several pages. 25 Early on, we learn
that the “Federal Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers.” 26 And in the next sentence, the Chief Justice explains what
“enumeration” means: “[R]ather than granting general authority to perform all the
conceivable functions of government, the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the
Federal Government’s powers. Congress may, for example, ‘coin Money,’
‘establish Post Offices,’ and ‘raise and support Armies.’ The enumeration of
powers is also a limitation of powers, because ‘[t]he enumeration presupposes
something not enumerated.’” 27
Next, we find out that the same constraint—enumeration—does not apply to
state governments “because the Constitution is not the source of their power.” 28
Instead, state governments are left in charge, by default, of the myriad functions
that make up everyday governance, such as “punishing street crime, running public
schools, and zoning property for development,” known collectively as “the police
power.” 29 Having distinguished the source and substance of federal power from
that of state power, the Chief Justice frames the legal question: Did the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) overextend Congress’s
constitutional authority? And he expounds on what role the judiciary ought to play
in resolving that question. “Members of [the Supreme] Court,” Chief Justice
Roberts writes, “are vested with the authority to interpret the law;” but they
“possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments,”
which have for that reason been “entrusted to our Nation’s elected leaders, who
can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them.” 30 At the same time,

23

See infra Part III.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
25
Id. at 2577–80.
26
Id. (internal citations omitted).
27
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 5, 7, 12; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824)).
28
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
29
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
30
Id. at 2579.
24
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this observation—which a theorist might call “countermajoritarian,” 31 but which
Chief Justice Roberts limns with simpler language—in no way attenuates the
Court’s power to enforce “the limits on federal power by striking down acts of
Congress that transgress those limits.” 32 As to that role, there “can be no
question.” 33 It is one the Court must play; it cannot be “abdicate[d].” 34 With that,
Chief Justice Roberts moves on to the substantive analysis, though not before
admonishing the reader to keep in mind “the background of these basic
principles.” 35
To whom is this lecture—pitched at the level of a “schoolchild” 36—aimed?
Not advocates, at least not in any straightforward sense. I cannot believe that Chief
Justice Roberts thinks any lawyer, however in need of tuning on the finer points of
constitutional doctrine, would find this explanation of federal and state power
enlightening. By the same token, it seems equally unlikely that judges are his
intended audience. They, too, know at least this much about constitutional
structure. Perhaps, then, the point is to speak directly to the “public,” either in the
sense of the present-day public—Chief Justice Roberts had sound reason to believe
that laypeople would be likely to read the NFIB opinion—or in the sense of a
future public, poised to learn from constitutional experience. Either way, the idea
would be some species of “democratic constitutionalism” or “demosprudence”: an
attempt by the Chief Justice to engage directly with the people, in a less mediated
fashion than usual. 37
To some extent, certainly. But even if this is Chief Justice Roberts’s purpose,
it does not fully explain his specific choice of subject matter and exposition. There
are many stories to be told about our constitutional world. That Chief Justice
Roberts chose to emphasize the structural underpinnings of law making, and the
limits those structures impose, suggests that he identifies something profound and
everlasting in these themes. Thus, even if from one perspective, we know that the
audience of Chief Justice Roberts’s civics lesson in NFIB was the public, from
another perspective, the lesson is also aimed to no audience in particular and,
31

See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–23 (1962). For a
helpful overview of dominant responses to Bickel’s “countermajoritarian challenge,” see
JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 10–16, 51–52, 66–73, 168 (2001).
32
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2579–80.
33
Id. at 2579.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 2580.
36
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“As every schoolchild learns,
our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the
Federal Government.”).
37
See Lani Guinier, Foreward: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV.
4, 15–16 (2008) (coining the term “demosprudence” to refer to the style and rhetoric that
dissenting Justices often employ to foment social and political mobilization); see also
Laura K. Ray, The Style of a Skeptic: The Opinions of Chief Justice Roberts, 83 IND. L.J.
997 (2008) (analyzing Chief Justice Roberts’s opinions on the D.C. Circuit to argue that he
writes with popular engagement in mind).
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simultaneously, to every possible audience. It is a timeless lesson, applicable to
every constitutional case, even when the interaction of state and federal power, as
such, is not the main site of dispute. And it is also a highly formal lesson, one that
does not resolve the question of where the PPACA stands so much as it illuminates
the question’s contours. To accede to the Chief Justice’s view of state and federal
power, however uncontroversial it may seem, is to recognize the parameters of our
constitutional system. His words remind us that Congress’s authority is not
unbounded; that even in a doctrinal setting which has provided for major
expansions of federal power over time—including the regulation of wheat grown
in one’s own backyard—there are still limits on what can be done. 38
These limits are widely “known,” of course, in the sense that propositionally,
every constitutional lawyer and judge (and probably many members of the public)
would agree they exist. But in another sense, it is precisely because they are known
that it is easy, as with all essential truths, to disregard them. In addition to his
democratic-constitutionalist impulse, then, the Chief Justice is also motivated by a
fundamentalist spirit. His words call forth basic tenets. They remind the reader that
behind the doctrinal complexity and factual messiness, constitutional law exhibits
a basic and enduring architecture. Again, this architecture is not necessarily novel.
But the reminder of its existence can nonetheless be profound.
A similar dynamic emerged in Stern v. Marshall, 39 a 2011 case about the
power of bankruptcy judges to issue final judgments about common law tort
claims arising out of the underlying bankruptcy proceedings. Although bankruptcy
judges are statutorily authorized to issue such judgments, 40 the Chief Justice,
writing for the Court, held that they were constitutionally barred from doing so.
This conclusion was based on a simple principle: for separation of powers reasons,
non-Article III judges are disallowed from hearing claims that arise under state or
federal law, with an exception for certain kind of “public rights” that arise “in
connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or
legislative departments” and whose adjudication the executive or legislative bodies
may accordingly oversee. 41 In Stern, the “public rights” exception did not apply; so
the adjudication of the state tort claim was illegitimate under Article III. 42

38

See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114–15, 128–29 (1942). This holding comes
back in the substance of the NFIB opinion as well, constituting the outer limit, analytically,
of what the Commerce Clause authorizes. See 132 S. Ct. at 2588 (“Wickard has long been
regarded as perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity, but the Government’s theory in this case would go much further.”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
39
131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
40
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (2012).
41
131 S. Ct. at 2610 (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 67–68 (1982)).
42
Id. at 2611; see also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 291–311 (2008)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (articulating a principled defense of the dominion that Article III
courts have over disputed questions of federal law).
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Before arriving at this conclusion, however, the Chief Justice spends a few
pages outlining the history and purpose of Article III. Its mandate is, first and
foremost, one of judicial independence and integrity: it is “‘an inseparable element
of the constitutional system of checks and balances’ that ‘both defines the power
and protects the independence of the Judicial Branch.’” 43 From this commitment to
judicial independence, it follows that power between the judiciary, on the one
hand, and the political branches, on the other, has to be strictly collocated: each
branch enjoys a unique scope of authority vis-à-vis the others. 44 At the same time,
“the three branches are not hermetically sealed from one another.” 45 Adjudicating
separation of powers disputes is a matter, therefore, of discerning the “basic
limitations” of each branch’s authority and of determining whether those
limitations have been “transgress[ed].” 46
Throughout all of this, Chief Justice Roberts makes sure to emphasize the
deeper purpose of power separation. It is not just some constitutional Rubik’s
Cube for jurist and academics to puzzle over; it is a source of individual liberty, a
prophylactic against abuse. 47 For evidence to this point, Chief Justice Roberts
reaches backward in time, past even the ratification history of Articles I, II, and III,
to a time when “colonists had been subjected to judicial abuses at the hand of the
43

Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608 (citing N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58).
Id. (“Under ‘the basic concept of separation of powers . . . that flow[s] from the
scheme of a tripartite government’ adopted in the Constitution, ‘the judicial Power of the
United States . . . can no more be shared’ with another branch than ‘the Chief Executive,
for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the
Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto.’” (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 704 (1973))); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
45
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609.
46
Id. at 2608.
47
A similar sentiment came through in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in City of
Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877–79 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The
Arlington Court held that Chevron deference applies to the threshold question of whether
the agency has jurisdiction over the relevant legal issue; in other words, the agency is
entitled to reasonableness deference as to its decision about whether it has authority to
decide the question before it. Id. at 1874–75. In Chief Justice Roberts’s view, however, this
result unduly delegates to an agency what “must be decided by a court.” Id. at 1877. This
undue delegation, moreover, is more than just an idle concern; in effect, it “leave[s] it to
the agency to decide when it is in charge,” fundamentally running afoul of Article III and
surrounding principles of constitutional power separation. Id. at 1880, 1886.
On the other side, it is clear that the Chief Justice takes very seriously the
justiciability constraints that Article III imposes on the federal judiciary. The limitations on
the federal judicial power, no less than its emboldenment, serve an important prophylactic
function in our constitutional system. See Already, LLC v. Nike, 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013)
(holding that no controversy exists, on mootness grounds, when one party has pledged a
covenant never to raise the relevant legal claim); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
535–49 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that under Article III, state officials
have no standing to contest the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act); Daimler
Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (holding that no taxpayer standing exists to
contest changes to in-state tax policy to make the latter more business friendly).
44
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Crown,” a state of affairs ascribable to the confusion of judicial and political
power. 48 For Chief Justice Roberts, it was precisely this experience of abuse that
inspired the Framers to adopt Article III in the first place, the goal of which was
(and is) to guarantee that judges should be motivated by service to the law rather
than favor to those in power. 49 It would disserve this principle, Chief Justice
Roberts reasons, to allow the government to freely “confer . . . ‘judicial Power’ on
entities outside Article III,” like the bankruptcy jurisdiction out of which Stern
arose. 50 Thus, he concludes that “[w]hen a suit is made of the stuff of the
traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789, and
is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding
that suit rests with Article III judges in Article III courts.” 51 Again, just as in NFIB,
this lesson does not resolve the central issue in Stern. But it frames the case,
clarifying the elementary distinction between judicial power and political power on
which the controversy turns. 52
A third example of the Chief Justice’s pedagogical impulse came in Citizens
United v. FEC, 53 the path-breaking campaign finance case from 2010. There, Chief
Justice Roberts did not write for the Court, but he concurred in the judgment—and
used that as a platform to mold the case’s legacy. This time around, the civics
lesson is not about competing sources of constitutional power, but rather about
stare decisis and the upheaval of precedent. The Chief Justice’s exposition closely
resembles that of NFIB, unfolding in a similar minuet of observations—on the one
hand, this; on the other hand, that. First, we learn that “[f]idelity to precedent—the
48

Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609.
Id. (“By appointing judges to serve without term limits, and restricting the ability of
the other branches to remove judges or diminish their salaries, the Framers sought to ensure
that each judicial decision would be rendered, not with an eye toward currying favor with
Congress or the Executive, but rather with the ‘[c]lear heads . . . and honest hearts’ deemed
‘essential to good judges.’” (quoting 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 363 (J. Andrews ed.,
1896))).
50
Id. at 2609.
51
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For a similar view about what cautionary
lessons the Framers took from their common law experience—this time in the
Establishment Clause setting—see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
702–04 (2012). In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts launches into an
involved narrative about religious repression through many centuries of English life, since
the adoption of the Magna Carta. Id.
52
The case’s larger context casts something of an ironic shadow over these issues.
Stern is a long and tortured litigation, originating almost twenty years before this specific
issue about Article III came before the Court, in connection to the infamous “Anna Nicole
Smith bankruptcy,” which commenced when twenty-seven-year-old ex-Playboy model
Vickie Marshall (aka Anna Nicole Smith) brought proceedings to take a share of the estate
of her late husband, Howard Marshall, who married Mrs. Marshall when he was sixty-three
years her senior. The juxtaposition between these background facts and the highfalutin
lesson in constitutional history is striking, to say the least. For more about the Anna Nicole
Smith bankruptcy, see generally Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2007).
53
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
49
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policy of stare decisis—is vital to the proper exercise of the judicial function . . .
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
legal principles, [and] fosters reliance on judicial decisions. . . . At the same time,
stare decisis is neither an inexorable command nor a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision, especially in constitutional cases.” 54 Sometimes,
bad precedents cry out for transformation. Many of our most cherished
constitutional rulings have stemmed from the Court’s disregard of precedent.
Were that impossible, Chief Justice Roberts plaintively reminds us, “segregation
would be legal, minimum wage laws would be unconstitutional, and the
Government could wiretap ordinary criminal suspects without first obtaining
warrants.” 55
Not surprisingly, the two principles comprising this double helix—on the one
hand, the need to respect precedent, and on the other hand, the need to reform
incorrect decisions—prove difficult to reconcile. To decide which to favor, Chief
Justice Roberts tells us, the Court must “balance the importance of having
constitutional questions decided against the importance of having them decided
right,” an inquiry that every point serves one “constitutional ideal—the rule of
law.” 56 In this respect, although in most cases the rule of law is best served by
following precedent, in some cases, “abrogating the errant precedent . . . might
better preserve the law’s coherence and curtail the precedent’s disruptive
effects.” 57 Like NFIB and Stern, the lesson here is purely formal. Chief Justice
Roberts’s narrative is a cautionary one, designed to cultivate appreciation for the
competing interests that inform difficult decisions about when to upend
precedent—not to provide a practical heuristic for navigating it. The point of the
lesson, in other words, is to remind the reader that care must be taken. But it does
not justify the direction in which the care, once taken, militates. 58
A fourth example is Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Board. 59 The question presented was whether Sarbanes-Oxley encroached on the
President’s Article II removal power by limiting the dismissal of Oversight Board

54

Id. at 377 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
55
Id. (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)), overruled by Brown v. Board
of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923),
overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
56
Id. at 377.
57
Id. at 378.
58
See generally Frank B. Cross, Chief Justice Roberts and Precedent: A Preliminary
Study, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1251 (2008) (analyzing a wide swath of cases to argue that Chief
Justice Roberts “has an apparent commitment to stare decisis, not in the sense that he feels
tightly bound by the directions of past cases, but in the sense that he is influenced by those
cases and uses them to project his own influence on future decisions”).
59
130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
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members to “for-cause” actions. 60 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts held
the Sarbanes-Oxley regime unconstitutional because it erected dual layers of
insulation between administrative officers and the President. This ran afoul of the
Take Care Clause, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned, because it would allow
administrative decisions more than one degree removed from executive
oversight—that is, it would not only prohibit the President from dismissing
underlings, as is already the case in certain administrative contexts, but also it
would prohibit the President from dismissing the officers in charge of dismissing
underlings, thereby stripping the President of true removal power. 61
The opinion begins with, and returns to, a lesson about the nature and history
of removal power. The power, we learn, is an implication of two facts: first, the
constitutional fact that “Article II vests ‘[t]he executive Power . . . in a President of
the United States of America, who must ‘Take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed’”; 62 second, the pragmatic fact that one person cannot be expected to
perform every state duty individually, and so may delegate his or her power to
others. 63 From this, it follows that the President retains the power to remove
appointed officials from office, should he determine that their decisions have failed
to advance the ideal embodied by the Take Care Clause.
Yet this power is “not without limit.”64 Under certain circumstances,
“Congress can . . . create independent agencies run by principal officers appointed
by the President, whom the President may not remove at will but only for good
cause,” and likewise, Congress can impose similar limitations on the removal of
underlings by principle officers. 65 Overall, then, the doctrine surrounding removal
power strikes a fragile balance between the complexities of an administrative state
and the constitutional requirement that the President “oversee the faithfulness of
the officers” who are charged, in practice, with executing the laws. 66 If Congress
could never create barriers of insulation between the President, his principle

60

See id. at 3146–47. For an excellent synopsis of how the PCAOB operated (while it
existed), and what role it played in the broader Sarbanes-Oxley regime, see Michael A.
Thomason, Jr., Note, Auditing the PCAOB: A Test to the Accountability of the Uniquely
Structured Regulator of Accountants, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1953, 1954–62 (2009).
61
Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153–55. Analytically, it is not clear that the
Court’s holding can be circumscribed to reach only dual (or great) insulation. See, e.g.,
Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund
v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541 (2011) (arguing that Free Enterprise Fund sets the
doctrinal gears in motion for contravening all instances of agency independence).
62
Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 1, 3).
63
Id. (“In light of ‘[t]he impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the
great business of the State,’ the Constitution provides for executive officers to ‘assist the
supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust.’” (quoting 30 WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 334 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939))).
64
Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146.
65
Id. at 3146–47.
66
Id. at 3147.
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officers, and their underlings, day-to-day administration might fall into disarray. 67
But the risk on the other side, of allowing too much insulation between the
President, his principle officers, and their underlings, is similarly stark: it is the
risk, in Chief Justice Roberts’s words, of public accountability disappearing; of
power being exercised “in the people’s name,” but without the people’s ability to
oversee it. 68
This risk, moreover, cannot be reduced to individual decisions or
administrations. It may well be that certain instances of delegation would entail no
adverse pragmatic consequences; it may even be the case that a given President
would find an “advantage[] in tying his own hands.” 69 For Chief Justice Roberts,
that possibility is simply inapposite to the constitutional issue. Separation of
powers, he makes clear, “does not depend on . . . whether ‘the encroached-upon
branch approves the encroachment.’” 70 The safeguard transcends any individual
person, even if that person happens to be the President. 71 Of course, these
observations alone no more control the question in Free Enterprise Fund than the
lesson on federal structure in NFIB controls the fate of the PPACA. In both
cases—indeed, in all of the cases examined so far—the lessons play a uniform
role: they frame, they circumscribe, they instruct.
B. Law’s Outer Boundaries
The examples in the last section showcased the Chief Justice’s penchant for
outlining constitutional lessons—often of a structural nature—before delving into
his substantive arguments. These lessons served to preface Chief Justice Roberts’s
analysis, setting up the stakes of the question in advance of his answer being
worked out. This section examines a distinct set of teaching moments, which serve,
in both function and form, as a complementary bookend. Instead of prefacing the
opinion, they arrive at the opinion’s end, and they provide the Chief Justice an
opportunity to pan out from the specific holding and ruminate on its larger
implications. These lessons, too, stress the limitations of our legal order. But they
do so by highlighting law’s inability to capture the full complexity of its social
context. If the point of the first batch of lessons was that law is structured by
internal rules, the point of this batch is that law is also structured by external
boundaries—boundaries that often allow deplorable acts to continue.
For example, in Snyder v. Phelps, 72 the Court had to decide whether an
aggrieved father, whose son had died on a tour of duty in Iraq, could recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) against protestors who showed

67

For a discussion of the arguments on both sides of this interest, see generally Rao,
supra note 61.
68
Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154.
69
Id. at 3155.
70
Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992)).
71
See id.
72
131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
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up to protest at the funeral services for his son. 73 The protestors hailed from the
Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, Kansas, a congregation that believes
America’s failure in Iraq (and in other conflicts) is the direct result of our
tolerating homosexuality. 74 The protestors moved to have the IIED claim
dismissed on First Amendment grounds, arguing that their demonstration was
protected speech under the First Amendment because it spoke to an issue of public
concern and was not provably false. 75 The Court was put in the difficult position of
deciding which legal prerogative should win the day: a state tort claim or First
Amendment principles. Ultimately, it favored the latter, with Chief Justice Roberts
writing. After examining the relevant record as to time, place, and manner, the
Chief Justice concluded that “simply put,” the protestors “had the right to be where
they were.” 76
But this conclusion alone, despite being legally cogent, left much
unaccounted for. In a sense, Westboro’s garish display pushed the First
Amendment to its limit. It forced the Justices to consider the cost, in very hard
cases, of remaining committed to the inviolability of free speech. 77 Recognizing
this, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court concludes by taking a step back
and reflecting on what the formal proceedings do not adequately capture. 78 The
opinion’s final section opens, in this vein, with the following musing: “Westboro
believes that America is morally flawed; many Americans might feel the same
about Westboro.” 79 Indeed, many might, and probably all of the Justices do. But
this does not license punishment. The whole point of the First Amendment, Chief
Justice Roberts makes plain, is that regulation must not turn on which viewpoints
seem, to certain observers, “morally flawed.” 80 Members of the public must be
allowed to express their opinions, however heinous those opinions may be, and
however “negligible” their contribution to public discourse.81 The First
Amendment does not necessitate equanimity or indifference. But it does require
equal treatment.82 Indeed, this is the note on which the opinion ends, in a rare and
arresting moment of civic poetry:
73

Id. at 1213–14.
Id. at 1213.
75
Id. at 1213–14.
76
Id. at 1218.
77
In this respect, Snyder very much echoes its predecessor National Socialist Party of
America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977), which held that the Nazi Party had the
right to demonstrate in a town heavily populated by Jews, notwithstanding the severe
emotional damage such a demonstration was likely to cause. 432 U.S. at 43–44.
78
See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Judging Pain, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 233, 244–45,
251 (2013) (arguing that Snyder stands among a canon of “tragic cases” in which full
resolution is impossible, due to right-remedy misalignment).
79
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
See id. (“Westboro believes that America is morally flawed; many Americans
might feel the same about Westboro. Westboro’s funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and
its contribution to public discourse may be negligible. But Westboro addressed matters of
74
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Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of
both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On the facts
before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a
Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech
on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice
requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in
this case. 83
Notice the parallels between this lesson and the internal lessons discussed
above. Both unfold as narratives of tension. In the last part, the tension was
between two structural principles of law—for example, the enumeration of federal
power colliding with the autonomy of state governments, or congressional
authority running up against the need for judicial independence. Here, the tension
is between two normative rather than structural principles: the ideal of free
expression clashing with the idealized promise of a world in which members of the
civilized public regard one another with mutual respect. 84 The latter is something
to imagine, to idealize, and to work toward. But it is not something that our law
guarantees. This is not to say that it would be impossible, in principle, for law to
guarantee it—just that our law does not. That it does not is one of our law’s
limitations. It may be a wise limitation. But it is a limitation nonetheless.
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Miller v. Alabama 85 struck a similar pitch. 86
The question presented was whether a mandatory sentence of life without parole
constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” as applied to a juvenile convicted of
capital murder. Justice Kagan wrote for the Court in an opinion that drew heavily
on two related precedents: Graham v. Florida, 87 holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits sentencing juveniles to life without parole for noncapital
offenses, 88 and Roper v. Simmons, 89 holding that the Eighth Amendment bars
public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the
guidance of local officials.”).
83
Id.
84
In the jurisprudence, this tension usually resolves in favor of First Amendment
protection. But not always. Doctrinally, the most notable exception is the “fighting words”
standard, which holds that an act of expression is not protected if “[its] very utterance
[tends to] inflict injury or tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The doctrine has proven theoretically
difficult to justify. See, e.g., Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine:
An Argument for its Interment, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1129, 1133–37 (1993). Nonetheless, it
is on a “fighting words” style of theory that Justice Alito hinges his dissent in Snyder. See
131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting) (calling Westboro’s speech a form of
“brutalization” that caused “severe and lasting emotional injury”).
85
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
86
Id. at 2477–82 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
87
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
88
Id. at 2034. Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts actually joins with the Court’s
liberals in this case—concurring in judgment but not in reasoning. See id. at 2036 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring in judgment); see infra 266.
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sentencing juveniles to death. 90 Building on the “spirit” of these two precedents,
Justice Kagan reasoned that the mandatory sentence of life without parole is
unconstitutional, even for capital crimes, as applied to juveniles.91 In dissent, Chief
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, excoriated the
majority for blurring, rather than vindicating, the lines that Graham and Roper
drew. 92 In the Chief Justice’s view, the whole point of Graham was that noncapital
offenses are different from capital offenses. 93 Similarly, the point of Roper was
that the sentence of death is different from the sentence of life without parole. 94 To
interpret these precedents as militating in favor of an Eighth Amendment violation
in Miller—when the crime is a capital offense and the punishment is not the death
penalty—is simply to abuse the concept of a legal distinction.95
I pass no judgment, one way or the other, on Chief Justice Roberts’s view of
the substantive Eighth Amendment question. My point is to take note of how his
dissent ends. Once again, Chief Justice Roberts concludes by taking stock of what
his legal conclusion, in its bare form, fails to capture:
It is a great tragedy when a juvenile commits murder—most of all
for the innocent victims. But also for the murderer, whose life has gone
so wrong so early. And for society as well, which has lost one or more of
its members to deliberate violence, and must harshly punish another. In
recent years, our society has moved toward requiring that the murderer,
his age notwithstanding, be imprisoned for the remainder of his life.
Members of this Court may disagree with that choice. Perhaps science
and policy suggest society should show greater mercy to young killers,
giving them a greater chance to reform themselves at the risk that they
will kill again. But that is not our decision to make. Neither the text of
the Constitution nor our precedent prohibits legislatures from requiring
89

543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Id. at 578.
91
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–70 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing, inter alia, that
“Graham and Roper and our individualized sentencing cases alike teach that in imposing a
State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult,”
and that this also happens under the mandatory life-without-parole regime under review in
Miller).
92
Id. at 2477–82.
93
Id. at 2480–81.
94
Id.
95
Id. (“That Graham does not imply today’s result could not be clearer. In barring life
without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, Graham stated that ‘[t]here is a line
between homicide and other serious violent offenses against the individual.’ The whole
point of drawing a line between one issue and another is to say that they are different and
should be treated differently. In other words, the two are in different categories.” (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)). Interestingly, this didactic turn in Chief Justice
Roberts’s rhetoric is not out of keeping with his general teaching impulse. This particular
instantiation fits into neither of the categories of pedagogy that I have described here. But it
is certainly pedagogical.
90
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that juvenile murderers be sentenced to life without parole. I respectfully
dissent. 96
Here, just as in Snyder, the final note is eulogistic rather than analytical. The
Chief Justice is not supplementing, or trying to further justify, his legal conclusion.
Instead, he is remarking on how difficult that conclusion is to bear, despite being
inescapable to reach. The difference between Snyder and Miller is that in the
former, a law is being curtailed despite the fact that it may be wise, whereas in the
latter, a law is being upheld despite the acute possibility that it is wicked. The
overarching message, however, is the same. Law is a bounded enterprise. By
design, it resolves issues on narrow grounds, meaning that in its wake, many
questions are left answered, indeed, unasked, because law is not designed to ask or
answer them. And the role of a constitutional judge is correspondingly narrow; no
matter how alluring it might be to reach beyond their charge as jurists and give in
to human temptation, the allure must be resisted. 97
A third example, of a distinct flavor but similar rhetorical pattern, is
Boumediene v. Bush. 98 After a multiyear jurisprudential saga, 99 and a prolonged
attempt at inter-branch cooperation gone awry, 100 in 2008 the Court confronted the
question of extraterritorial detention head-on. In a historic opinion for the Court,
Justice Kennedy found that habeas review extends to Guantanamo Bay, due to the
United States’ “de facto” sovereignty in the region, and in light of the sheer
duration of many detainees’ otherwise unreviewable sentences.101 Chief Justice
Roberts dissented. 102 He offered a variety of arguments against the majority’s
view—most importantly, that the threshold question in the case, which he thought
Justice Kennedy failed to answer, was whether the procedures put in place by

96

Id. at 2482 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Carrington v. United States, 503 F.3d 888, 894–95 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Noonan, J., concurring).
98
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
99
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (effectively overturning the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 as an insufficient procedural protection); Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466 (2004) (conferring Article III jurisdiction over habeas actions in Guantanamo
Bay); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (reinforcing the multifactor test for
determining the sufficiency of habeas substitutes for American citizens detained at
Guantanamo Bay); see also Aaron L. Jackson, Habeas Corpus in the Global War on
Terror: An American Drama, 65 A.F. L. REV. 263 (2010) (tracing a detailed genealogy of
the battle over the jurisprudential meaning of Guantanamo Bay from 9/11 until
Boumediene).
100
See generally Owen Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN
L. 643 (2008) (arguing that the trajectory from Rasul and Hamdi to Hamdan is an example
of the shortcomings of popular theories of judicial minimalism and interbranch dialogue).
101
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
102
Id. 801–02 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
97
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Congress provided adequate protections to detainees. 103 For Chief Justice Roberts,
the answer was yes. 104
At the end of his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts turned his sights on the larger
questions that Boumediene evoked. In a rueful tone, he asked what the majority’s
intervention, however high-minded, had actually accomplished. Exceedingly little,
in his view:
So who has won? Not the detainees. The Court’s analysis leaves them
with only the prospect of further litigation to determine the content of
their new habeas right, followed by further litigation to resolve their
particular cases, followed by further litigation before the D.C. Circuit—
where they could have started had they invoked the [Detainee Treatment
Act] procedure. Not Congress, whose attempt to determine—through
democratic means—how best to balance the security of the American
people with the detainees’ liberty interests has been unceremoniously
brushed aside. Not the Great Writ, whose majesty is hardly enhanced by
its extension to a jurisdictionally quirky outpost, with no tangible benefit
to anyone. Not the rule of law, unless by that is meant the rule of
lawyers, who will now arguably have a greater role than military and
intelligence officials in shaping policy for alien enemy combatants. And
certainly not the American people, who today lose a bit more control
over the conduct of this Nation’s foreign policy to unelected, politically
unaccountable judges. 105
Here, as in Snyder and Miller, the animating idea is that law can only do so
much. The majority in Boumediene capitalized on the opportunity to extend the
territorial scope of Article III in the interest of what it understood to be deeper
justice. For Chief Justice Roberts, however, the effort fell flat. It became an
overreach of judicial power that disserved not only the principles of wartime power
that it flouted, but more importantly, the interests of the detainees it sought to help.
As such, Boumediene is a better—and more tragic—illustration of law’s external
limitations than either Snyder or Miller. In both of those cases, it would be possible
to rejoin Chief Justice Roberts by saying, “You are right in theory, but in practice,
remedial action is so exigent that it requires overriding the limitations you
identify.” Not so in Boumediene: the whole point of Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent
is that the majority has achieved, at best, a pyrrhic victory, and it might have
achieved no victory at all. Contorted beyond its province, law becomes impotent—
or worse.
Chief Justice Roberts’s canon is replete with codas like these. Some—
following the style of the cases just discussed—strike an elegiac tone. For instance,

103

Id. at 802–03.
Id. at 801–02.
105
Id. at 826 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
104
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in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 106 a case about the First Amendment
implications of an antiterrorism statute, Chief Justice Roberts ends his opinion
with a somber invocation of the Preamble to the Constitution, which makes clear
that the people of the United States ordained and established that charter of
government in part to “provide for the common defence,” difficult as that may be
to balance against civil liberties in practice. 107 Another example is Caperton v.
Massey, 108 a case about whether a state appellate judge violated Due Process when
he did not recuse himself from a case in which the defendant was a coal company
that had made substantial donations to his judicial campaign. At the end of a
dissent that tallies—literally—forty different points of uncertainty that the
majority’s view inadvertently introduced into the state appeals process, Chief
Justice Roberts closes by observing that he is “sure there are cases where a
‘probability of bias’ should lead the prudent judge to step aside, but the judge fails
to do so,” and that this case may be “one of them.” 109 But, he continues, “opening
the door to recusal claims under the Due Process Clause, for an amorphous
‘probability of bias,’ will itself bring our judicial system into undeserved disrepute,
and diminish the confidence of the American people in the fairness and integrity of
their courts.” 110 A similar rumination comes at the end of Dolan v. United
States, 111 a case about whether a sentencing court may issue a restitution order
despite failing to do so within the ninety-day window allotted by statute. 112 In the
interest of making plaintiffs whole, the majority concluded that the sentencing
court was permitted to issue such an order. Chief Justice Roberts, donning his
formalist cap, disagreed, fully candid about the fact that denying the court’s
restitution power on such technical grounds will mean that, in certain cases—like
this one—that “victims may suffer” in light of a “trial court[’s] blunder[].” 113 And
that, of course, is to be lamented. But in Chief Justice Roberts’s view, it is also the
“unavoidable result of having a system of rules.” 114
There are also times when Chief Justice Roberts takes the opportunity, at
opinion’s end, to reiterate law’s limitations through caustic, often quite funny
106

130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
See id. at 2731 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Preamble to the
Constitution proclaims that the people of the United States ordained and established that
charter of government in part to ‘provide for the common defence.’ As Madison explained,
‘[s]ecurity against foreign danger is . . . an avowed and essential object of the American
Union.’ We hold that, in regulating the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to
provide to foreign terrorist organizations, Congress has pursued that objective consistent
with the limitations of the First and Fifth Amendments.”) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 41
(James Madison)).
108
556 U.S. 868 (2009).
109
Id. at 902 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
110
Id.
111
130 S. Ct. 2533 (2010).
112
Id. at 2537; see 18 U. S. C. § 3664(d)(5) (2006).
113
Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2549 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
114
Id. at 2549.
107
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rhetoric. One example is Georgia v. Randolph, 115 in which the Court invalidated a
warrantless search that to which one co-occupant of a home consented but the
other co-occupant did not. 116 Finding this conclusion analytically silly and
practically unworkable, Chief Justice Roberts concludes with a smirk:
The majority reminds us, in high tones, that a man’s home is his castle
but even under the majority’s rule, it is not his castle if he happens to be
absent, asleep in the keep, or otherwise engaged when the constable
arrives at the gate. Then it is his co-owner’s castle. And, of course, it is
not his castle if he wants to consent to entry, but his co-owner objects. 117
Another example is Brewer v. Quarterman, 118 an Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) case about the use of mitigating evidence in which
the Court goes—frankly—off the rails in its determination that a Texas capital
sentencing statute violated clearly established federal law by preventing the
sentencing jury from considering certain forms of mitigating evidence.119 Chief
Justice Roberts’s dissent is acidic and swift. After demonstrating that at the time of
petitioner’s capital conviction, the question of federal law on which the majority’s
reversal turns was manifestly ambiguous—that is, just the opposite of “clearly
established”—Chief Justice Roberts offers this final thought:
In today’s decisions, the Court trivializes AEDPA’s requirements and
overturns decades-old sentences on the ground that they were contrary to
clearly established federal law at the time—even though the same
Justices who form the majority today were complaining at that time that
this Court was changing that “clearly established” law.
115

547 U.S. 103 (2007).
Id. at 106.
117
Id. at 142 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts further glosses his
critique with the following memorable passage:
116

Just as the source of the majority’s rule is not privacy, so too the interest it
protects cannot reasonably be described as such. That interest is not protected if
a co-owner happens to be absent when the police arrive, in the backyard
gardening, asleep in the next room, or listening to music through earphones so
that only his co-occupant hears the knock on the door. That the rule is so random
in its application confirms that it bears no real relation to the privacy protected
by the Fourth Amendment. What the majority’s rule protects is not so much
privacy as the good luck of a co-owner who just happens to be present at the
door when the police arrive. Usually when the development of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence leads to such arbitrary lines, we take it as a signal
that the rules need to be rethought.
Id. at 136–37.
118
550 U.S. 286 (2007).
119
Id. at 289.
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Still, perhaps there is no reason to be unduly glum. After all, today
the author of a dissent issued in 1988 writes two majority opinions
concluding that the views expressed in that dissent actually represented
“clearly established” federal law at that time. So there is hope yet for the
views expressed in this dissent, not simply down the road, but tunc pro
nunc. Encouraged by the majority’s determination that the future can
change the past, I respectfully dissent. 120
If this is just snark, it is effective snark. To my mind, however, it seems more
than that. Where many of the citations above struck a more soulful tone, these last
few verge on acerbic. But their ambition is the same: Chief Justice Roberts is
shaping a claim about the limitations of law. However sore the temptation may be
to extend law’s boundaries in the pursuit of justice, it must be avoided. The
boundaries exist for a reason. They are, simply put, what make law law.
II. RESUSCITATING THE UMPIRE METAPHOR
The last Part was designed to showcase the Chief Justice’s penchant for
infusing his opinions with lessons about law’s constitutive limitations: its internal
structure and its external boundaries. In this Part, I connect Chief Justice Roberts’s
civic lessons to another aspect his judicial persona: the infamous umpire metaphor
from his confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. I argue that
the metaphor aligns, conceptually, with the judicial philosophy that emerged in his
civics lessons. Both concern the dialectics of constraint: the way the judge is
simultaneously constrained—by the parameters of the judicial role—but also
constraining—in exercising authority over other actors.
This is not how the umpire image has been previously construed. For most
skeptical observers, in both academic and popular venues, the metaphor amounts
to little more than right-wing wordplay. 121 Indeed, most commentators have dealt
with the metaphor in largely cartoonish terms, giving precious little regard to Chief
Justice Roberts’s actual words. The goal of this Part is to rectify that unfortunate
trend. The trend would not be so unfortunate if the umpire metaphor were not so
prominently associated with Chief Justice Roberts’s persona. As it stands,
however, many regard the metaphor as an example of the Chief Justice’s mischief.
The record deserves to be corrected—if nothing else, to shore up the claim
advanced above that Chief Justice Roberts is motivated in some measure by
principle, not crass ideology.
120

Id. at 279–80 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See Katrina vanden Heuvel, Retiring Chief Justice Roberts’s Umpire Analogy,
WASH. POST (June 28, 2010, 5:16 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/201
0/06/retiring_chief_justice_roberts.html (arguing that the umpire metaphor works to erase
preexisting biases that inevitably color the judicial process); Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr.
Nice Guy, THE NEW YORKER (May 25, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/
05/25/090525fa_fact_toobin (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts’s voting record during his
first four terms casts disconcerting light on the umpire metaphor).
121
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A. Miscontruing the Metaphor
Pejorative accounts of the umpire image typically zero in on the following
passage:
Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody
plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball
game to see the umpire. 122
This passage has aroused criticism for its emphasis on constraint: in Chief
Justice Roberts’s hands, the judge’s occupation becomes unduly narrow and
“limited,” having only to do with “rule application.” This is problematic, according
to critics, for three reasons. First, it implies an ideal of objectivity out of synch
with the reality of constitutional law.123 Second, it disregards the way Supreme
Court Justices make rules in addition to applying them. 124 Third—the reason that
overarches the first two—is that despite Chief Justice Roberts’s avoidance of the
term “judicial restraint,” his remarks amount to a tacit defense of right-wing
constitutional theory. That is, whatever umpiring might mean, Chief Justice
Roberts’s intended meaning is clear: the umpire is an emblem of judicial power
neutered. 125
Each of these responses contains a kernel of insight. But they overstate the
case. A main unifying thread is that umpiring fails to account for the role that
extralegal knowledge, personal conviction, and “life experiences” play in
judging. 126 Legal interpretation, the claim goes, necessarily involves “bias,”
122

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
55 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
123
See, e.g., Wardlaw, supra note 15, at 1633–34 (lauding the virtue of infusing
jurisprudence with “empathy” and life experience); McKee, supra note 15, at 1710
(applying the language of “bias” to judicial decision making).
124
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 15, at 1051 (“No serious person thinks that the rules
that judges in our system apply, particularly appellate judges and most particularly the
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, are given to them the way the rules of baseball are
given to umpires.”).
125
There is an interesting wrinkle in this form of argumentation: if the analogy to
umpiring is formally indeterminate, and only becomes problematic in Chief Justice
Roberts’s hands, this could be construed as praise rather than critique. The purpose of an
analogy, after all, is to draw a formal link between essential characteristics. Cf. Allen,
supra note 15, at 527 (pointing out the limited explanatory power of analogies as to
specific details). We do not typically lambaste analogies for their interpretive instability.
Indeed, the possibility of taking an analogy in multiple directions is often evidence of its
utility, not its failure.
126
See Walker, supra note 15, at 1214 (arguing that umpiring is an incomplete
metaphor because “[the law] varies according to who is reading it,” a proposition for which
he cites the growing inconsistency of, and presence of internal schisms in, late twentieth
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whereas baseball interpretation does not. 127 This characterization of umpiring—as
perfectly objective, freed from the interpretive baggage of judging—is far from
self-evident. In fact, it is more likely false. 128 For example, Judge Vaughn Walker
cites to MLB umpire Ken Kaiser’s first-hand account that “[s]trike zones are like
personalities; everybody’s got one, and no two are the same. The strike is probably
the most important part of the playing field even though it doesn’t really exist. It’s
an imaginary box.” 129 And Judge Posner makes the same point with a tongue-incheek parable about “three umpires” who are asked “to explain the epistemology
of balls and strikes,” to which “[t]he first umpire [responds by explaining] that he
calls them as they are, the second that he calls them as he sees them, and the third
that there are no balls or strikes until he calls them.” 130 And yet all three are simply
calling balls and strikes. 131
These statements of indeterminacy are plainly meant to undermine Chief
Justice Roberts’s use of the metaphor. 132 Analytically, however, they would seem

century law as evidence); Wardlaw, supra note 15, at 1633–35. Cf. Fried, supra note 16, at
643–44 (arguing that if law does not require reliance on experience, it at least requires
metarules to discriminate between interpretive frameworks, and these metarules turn on
something more personal than formal). Of course, what counts as a rule, and what counts as
a metarule, can on occasion become a more difficult problem than first appearances imply.
This distinction prefigures my discussion of rules and principles below. See infra Part II.A.
127
See, e.g., Allen, supra note 15, at 533 (arguing that “the [umpire] analogy breaks
down because judges will never be able to prevent their life experiences or even overall
judicial philosophies from influencing their decisions”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati,
Ranking Judges According to Citation Bias (As a Means to Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1279, 1279–80 (2007); McKee, supra note 15, at 1712 (arguing that “[t]he umpire
metaphor obscures the reality of personal bias”).
128
The issue of whether umpires are biased is different, of course, from the issue of
the risks that biased umpiring poses. It may be true that analytically, judges and umpires
are biased in the same way, but that the consenquences of bias diverge depending on the
setting. In other words, even conceding that umpires and judges employ similar interpretive
processes, it is still possible to conclude that judges are more dangeous in virtue of their
biases than umpires. See Siegel, supra note 15, at 712 (outlining the risks associated with
taking the umpire metaphor too seriously, given the gravity of the Court’s occupation). But
this question—the risks that bias engenders—is distinct from the question that
commentators have posed, or least purported to pose, as to whether bias exists in the first
place. The latter goes to the nature of the interpretive act, the former, to its consequences.
129
Walker, supra note 15, at 1213 (citing KENNETH J. KAISER & DAVID FISHER,
PLANET OF THE UMPS: A BASEBALL LIFE FROM BEHIND THE PLATE 183–84 (2003)).
130
Posner, supra note 15, at 1054.
131
Id.
132
Judge Posner explicitly “set[s]” the three images of umpiring “against Roberts’s
umpire analogy.” Id. But it is true for the others as well. Judge Walker, for example, calls
the umpire metaphor “inadequate” directly after he finishes sketching the parallel between
judges and umpires. Walker, supra note 15, at 1215. Professor Siegel, for his part, notes the
parallel in passing before dismissing it as irrelevant; the clear implication, however, is that
he takes the parallel to weaken Chief Justice Roberts’s claim, because it suggests that Chief
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to have the opposite effect. If ball-strike determinations and legal conclusions are
both acts of discretion, accountable to an underlying rule but also contingent on
individual perspective, then umpiring adeptly describes constitutional judging.
Either umpiring involves interpretive discretion, or the umpire metaphor fails. One
pillar must fall.
Putting the objectivity of umpires to one side, critical responses to the
metaphor also rest on a flimsy conceptual distinction between rules and principles.
To distinguish ball-strike determinations from constitutional holdings,
commentators have suggested that the latter involves a higher-level interpretive
process than the former. It requires translating from an abstract concept, like equal
protection, to a concrete holding: this, as opposed to calling balls and strikes,
which merely involves the application of an already-concrete rule to a just-asconcrete situation. Despite the intuitive appeal of this view, however, it is far from
clear that the strike zone—an “imaginary” construct 133—is any less abstract than
the principle of equal protection. It may well be that the umpire metaphor poorly
captures the institutional role of Supreme Court Justices. 134 But from that
observation alone, it hardly follows that the metaphor fails to describe the
interpretive task of constitutional judging. 135 The two questions are distinct. 136
Justice Roberts was “wrong about much of baseball” in addition to being wrong, in
Siegel’s view, about much of law. Siegel, supra note 15, at 707 & n.25.
133
See Walker, supra note 15, at 1213–14 (citing KAISER & FISHER, supra note 129).
134
In this vein, consider Aaron Zelinsky’s creative—and seemingly apt—suggestion
that the MLB Commissioner offers a superior baseball analog for the actual occupation of a
Supreme Court Justice. See Zelinsky, supra note 15, at 112, 118–24. The main evidence is
this: commissioners have the power to promulgate high-level regulations—for example, in
1988, when Bart Giamatti decided to “lower[] the strike zone so that more high strikes
would be called”—which Zelinsky considers analogous to high-level constitutional
decisions. Id. at 124 (quoting Charles Siebert, Baseball’s Renaissance Man: Bart Giamatti,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 36).
135
Indeed, in Chief Justice Roberts’s hands, the point of the metaphor is largely to
distinguish, in the first instance, between referees, whose occupation is to draw and enforce
the games boundaries, and players, whose occupation is to participate in the game. See
infra Part II.B. Unless the point of the commissioner metaphor is that MLB commissioners,
in contrast to umpires on the ground, could be said to participate in the game—a reading
that meets with neither textual evidence nor intuitive support—the commissioner is
essentially a referee, relegated, in Chief Justice Roberts’s lexicon, to the role of umpiring
rather than playing. Institutionally, the commissioner may be a superreferee. But that
makes little difference to the question of the interpretive model that underpins his
decisions.
136
This is where the shortcomings of Zelinsky’s otherwise apt modification become
apparent. See generally Zelinsky, supra note 15. As a model of the institutional role that
Justices play vis-à-vis other judicial actors, the “commissioner of baseball” metaphor is
certainly superior to the umpire metaphor. But as a model of interpretation—trying to
capture the thought process by which Justices reach constitutional holdings—the two
metaphors seem to me equivalent. And in a third sense, the umpire metaphor could actually
be said to be superior in virtue of its simplicity. Namely, if the idea is to capture something
about the policing function of the judiciary, ensuring that the other branches act
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In this vein, consider Neil Siegel’s critique of the umpire image through the
lens of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. 137
Siegel argues that Chief Justice Roberts, invoking the metaphor, “seemed to be
assuming that [interpretive] controversy arises regarding particular instances of
rule application . . . not concerning the meaning of the rule itself,” 138 a view that
“presumably rel[ied] on the fact that a hit ball is either foul or fair, and that the
baseball rule defining the strike zone seems relatively clear.” 139 The purpose of
Siegel’s distinction between “clear” and “relatively clear” rules is not to
differentiate but to conflate. He wants to suggest (1) that foul-fair determinations
and ball-strike determinations, despite their different shades of clarity, are both
functionally “clear” and (2) that both differ, in the same sense, from constitutional
determinations.
Siegel’s view has some vanishing appeal. The trouble is that the difference
between “clear” and “relatively clear” rules is not incidental to constitutional law.
It is foundational and generative. 140 Just as in Siegel’s example, a foul ball is
“clear,” whereas the strike zone is “relatively clear,” some constitutional rules are
“clear,” such as the requirement that Presidents be thirty-five years old, 141 whereas
others, such as the meaning of equal protection, are only “relatively clear.” By this,
I mean that equal protection determinations, though not self-evident, do hew to a
consistent set of rules. 142 The Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to

constitutionally, the umpire provides a more natural metaphor: umpires on the ground,
vigilantly ensuring respect for the rules. This stands in contrast to the commissioner, who
occupies a much more rarefied position, taking stock of many competing interests, forging
compromises, and playing a public relations role.
137
See generally Siegel, supra note 15 (criticizing the umpire analogy in light of
recent cases, including Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007)).
138
Id. at 707.
139
Id. Siegel’s argument is by no means unique. Indeed, it is illustrative of the
scholarly trend. See, e.g., Wardlaw, supra note 15, at 1640–52 (making similar arguments
with respect to Safford v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009)).
140
Cf. Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
26 (1992) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices can be divided not only by results, but also
by methods with a “rules” camp on the one hand and a “standards” camp on the other,
cleaving along the same lines as would a “clear” versus “relatively clear” distinction).
141
Wardlaw, supra note 15, at 1634.
142
This proposition, it bears noting, is in no way undermined by the observation that
different judges apply the rules differently given the same underlying facts; that much is
plainly true of umpiring as well. Nor is it undermined by the observation that in the
abstract, equal protection analysis might take many different forms. See, e.g., Owen M.
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 107–08 (1976);
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472 (2004). Pointing to
such exercises, however, as evidence of interpretive indeterminacy would be like citing the
opinions of baseball fans or ESPN commentators about their views of where the strike zone
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require that state actions that employ racial classifications be narrowly tailored to
meet an interest that qualifies as “compelling.” 143 This definition is factually
indeterminate, of course—and the Court, alongside the nation, is engaged in a
protracted dispute over what its meaning in practice ought to be. But the fact
remains: there is widespread agreement about the formal contours of the Clause,
and about the type of review it requires.
To put the same point otherwise, for all the controversy that laces equal
protection jurisprudence, viewpoints that are bitterly divided as a matter of fact
converge as a matter of law. In a case like Parents Involved, all agree that (1) racial
classifications are inherently suspect, 144 (2) the state has an interest in redressing
conditions of segregation, 145 and (3) any effort to do so must be narrowly
tailored. 146 In other words, every single Justice believes the children in Seattle and
Louisville were treated unequally; they disagree only about whether the unequal
treatment is justified in light of an overriding state interest.147 And even here, both
sides agree that the Court is charged with undoing conditions of segregation; they
disagree only as to what counts as “segregation,” and in particular, whether
“segregation,” for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, encompasses only de jure
segregation, or de facto segregation as well. 148 I am not trying to understate the
normative salience of this disagreement. Hardly any constitutional issue puts more
at stake. 149 My point is that analytically, this is a narrow disagreement, a question
of how to apply an already-delineated rule in context. It is like a strike on the
outside corner—or, depending on one’s view, a ball.
is as evidence of ambiguity when umpires call pitches. As a matter of practice, the lines are
drawn—however rich are the possibilities of what might otherwise be.
143
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 711–12
(4th ed. 2011).
144
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720
(2007) (opinion of the Court); id. at 823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
145
See id. at 720–22 (opinion of the Court); id. at 823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146
See id. at 733–35 (opinion of the Court); id. at 846–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147
This may, in fact, be a terrible way to conceive of the Equal Protection Clause,
because it leaves fundamental rights suspended in the limbo of a balancing test rather than
sharply vindicating them. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L. J. 427, 436–
37 (1997) (“Classificationism cannot properly vindicate equal protection principles.”). But
given that analysis is conducted this way, the more natural inference is that equal
protection is a terrible example for Professor Siegel’s argument.
148
For a concise summary of the normative stakes involved in this debate, and of the
outrage that it can quite rightfully cause, see Winter, supra note 11.
149
This proposition hardly requires a citation; one has only to open a newspaper. But
it has not been lost on the commentators. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law
as Trademark, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385, 402–04 (2009) (arguing that Parents Involved,
and like cases, can be understood as a war over the “trademark” of Brown); Scarlet Kim,
Note, Judicial Opinion as Historical Account: Parents Involved and the Modern Legacy of
Brown v. Board of Education, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 159, 163–64 (2011) (arguing that
the fractured opinion in Parents Involved reflects a tension between judges acting in their
dual roles of dispensing justice and giving a truthful account of matters past).
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B. Misrepresenting the Metaphor
A larger problem looms. Even if commentators are correct in their assessment
of the “calling balls and strikes” image—that, by itself, it imagines an unduly
narrow and anemic conception of judging—the image has been plucked out of
context. Which means that commentators have told only half of the story, eliding
the larger narrative about the rule of law that Chief Justice Roberts meant to
convey. 150 A fair reading of the metaphor—the full metaphor, that is—therefore
must begin from renewed attention to Chief Justice Roberts’s actual words. As
above, commentary has focused on the following excerpt, with the italicized
portions receiving especially lavish attention:
Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way around.
Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody
plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball
game to see the umpire. 151
What has not received lavish attention—indeed, what has received no
attention—are the passages that follow this invocation of umpiring. After briefly
extolling the judicial virtues of humility, respect for stare decisis, and openmindedness, 152 Chief Justice Roberts launches into a heartfelt parable about “the
rule of law.” It is worth quoting in full:
Mr. Chairman, when I worked in the Department of Justice in the
Office of the Solicitor General, it was my job to argue cases for the
United States before the Supreme Court. I always found it very moving
to stand before the Justices and say, “I speak for my country.” But it was
after I left the Department and began arguing cases against the United
States, that I fully appreciated the importance of the Supreme Court in
our constitutional system. Here was the United States, the most powerful
150

Whether Chief Justice Roberts’s story about judging is, in a propositional sense,
true, the point is that it is hardly the right-wing totem that critics have made it out to be. In
fact, once the dialectical nature of the metaphor emerges (infra), it becomes
correspondingly clear that the accusation that Chief Justice Roberts was playing right-wing
word games is at least as likely to be backwards as it is to be true. In other words, given the
dual role served by the metaphor, simultaneously minimizing and lionizing the judicial
role, the proposition that Chief Justice Roberts was using the umpire metaphor to
communicate, in code, with the political right seems to me as likely to be diametrically
wrong as it is to be right. That is, it seems just as likely that he was fleecing the right by
presenting a metaphor that seems harmonious with right-wing judicial philosophies but is,
in fact, celebratory of the federal judiciary in a manner that conservatives customarily are
not.
151
Roberts Hearing, supra note 122, at 55 (emphasis added).
152
Id. at 55–56.
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entity in the world, aligned against my client, and yet all I had to do was
convince the Court that I was right on the law, and the Government was
wrong, and all that power and might would recede in deference to the
rule of law.
That is a remarkable thing. It is what we mean when we say that we
are a Government of laws and not of men. It is that rule of law that
protects the rights and liberties of all Americans. It is the envy of the
world, because without the rule of law, any rights are meaningless.
President Ronald Reagan used to speak of the Soviet Constitution,
and he noted that it purported to grant wonderful rights of all sorts to
people, but those rights were empty promises because that system did not
have an independent judiciary to uphold the rule of law and enforce those
rights. We do, because of the wisdom of our Founders and the sacrifices
of our heroes over the generations to make their vision a reality. 153
At first blush, this narrative might seem disconnected from the umpire
metaphor—but only at first blush. In fact, the two intertwine fundamentally. For
Chief Justice Roberts, the umpire metaphor is consonant with the proposition that
judges “are servants of the law, not the other way around.” 154 That is, the sense in
which judges ought to behave like umpires is the same sense in which they ought
to “serve” law. This is a pleasant-sounding ideal; what does it mean? The force of
Chief Justice Roberts’s narrative rises and falls on this question, and it is subtler
than first appearances might imply. Chief Justice Roberts tells a story of judicial
supremacy by focusing on the rule of law ethereally, without emphasizing the
actual people, judges—or the actual institution, the Supreme Court—required to
make the rule of law real. In this story, judges are lionized as “servants,” but in that
capacity, they play a “limited role” that no one wants to “see.” Their role might be
noble, but it is by no means grand. What is grand, by contrast, is the covenant of
maintaining a government “of laws and not of men” and the related ideal of
ensuring, via consistent and limited construction, that “rights” remain
“meaning[ful].” 155
Something sly underpins these abstractions. The conception of adjudication
that Chief Justice Roberts exalts—law as an astral plane where all parties become
singularities, required to be “right on the law” and nothing else—is possible only
insofar as an institution exists to give it force. 156 As a matter of constitutional
structure, of course, this point is obvious. But it also bears an interesting
relationship to Chief Justice Roberts’s words: although the judicial role is heartily
praised in the abstract, we hear very little about the role or behavior of actual
153

Id.
Id. at 55.
155
See id.
156
This is a rather painful lesson of constitutional history, one that we are continually
reminded of, at any moment that rights and remedies become misaligned. See BrennanMarquez, supra note 78, at 233–36; Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J.
585, 628–35 (1983).
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judges. Imagine, after all, the myriad other stories that Chief Justice Roberts might
have told to make an equivalent point about the sanctity of our constitutional
system—for example, a story about Brown v. Board of Education, 157 or any other
iconic case that for Chief Justice Roberts showcases the primacy of law’s rule; or a
story about a historical judge whom Chief Justice Roberts admires as a symbol of
judicial integrity; 158 or perhaps a story about how difficult it can be, as a judge, to
remain loyal to the rule of law when the temptation to do otherwise sets in. 159
These hypothetical stories would have operated by highlighting the centrality
of judges, not relegating them to the institutional shadows. Chief Justice Roberts
opted for the latter route. Whether Chief Justice Roberts consciously designed his
remarks to perform this rhetorical maneuver—extolling the judicial role writ large,
even as the concrete figure of the judge disappears from view—or whether it
emerged from something altogether more ingenuous is an open question. Either
way, the emphasis on the importance of judicial power—as opposed to political
power—casts helpful light on the larger structure of Chief Justice Roberts’s
metaphor. Against the image of umpiring, he sets up two counter-images: pitching
and batting. These stand for the activity of the political branches. When he
promises to remember that his only job is to “call balls and strikes,” the idea is
that, as a judge, his role is reactive, not proactive. Judges fashion and enforce the
parameters of the game, so to speak, but it is the job of legislators and
administrators to play. This model does not render the judiciary especially passive,
nor does it render the judiciary especially active. Instead, the bifurcation between
playing and officiating conveys a broader, structural point about the roles that
different state actors occupy. Like the civics lessons examined above, the point is
formal pointing nature. It offers no substantive guidance about how state actors
ought to fulfill their roles. In the same sense that batting and pitching offer no
particular dictate, as metaphors, about how laws ought to be drafted, so the
umpiring metaphor offers no specific guidance about how judges should review
those laws and put them into practice.
But neither is the metaphor empty. It makes clear that lawmakers—players—
begin from a space of relative freedom, whereas judges—umpires—are at every
moment hemmed in by their roles. Players can be creative; they can achieve
spectacular feats. The umpire’s role, by contrast, is fixed, unpretentious, and for
157

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
In a way, Chief Justice Roberts did tell this story. But it came at the end of the
confirmation process, not the beginning. See Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and
Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71
OHIO ST. L.J. 1149, 1231–34 (2010) (noting the ways that Chief Justice Roberts drew on
his experience clerking for Henry Friendly during his confirmation hearings). See also John
Fabian Witt, The Secret History of the Chief Justice’s Obamacare Decision—A
Commentary by John Fabian Witt ‘99, BALKINZATION (June 29, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://
www.law.yale.edu/news/15758.htm (suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts’s connection to
Henry Friendly partially explains his realism about the taxing power).
159
This type of story might have fallen into the same grooves as the second batch of
teaching moments discussed above. See supra Part I.B.
158
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the most part, thankless. About this much, Chief Justice Roberts is certainly right:
no one attends baseball games to see the umpires. 160 Their work becomes
prominent only when they err—ESPN maintains no highlight reel of great calls,
but a poor call reverberates, and burns with a sense of injustice not unlike the
response to a poor judicial decision, for a long time after. 161 This, indeed, is why
umpires occupy such a difficult post. If they are not active enough, the game
dilapidates into anarchy. But if they become overactive, the game loses its basic
character. The balance is fragile, uncertain. To umpire properly is not just to
enforce rules. It is to enforce the rules in a manner that registers as legitimate in the
eyes of the observer-participants who make the game worth playing. 162
And the same is true, of course, of judging. Law’s source materials—subject
to tireless interpretive dispute—circumscribe what judges can do, and Chief Justice
Roberts’s metaphor certainly acknowledges this. But it is not his main emphasis.
The metaphor focuses, instead, on the crucial role that judges play in safeguarding
the rule of law, the organizing principle that ensures legitimacy in government, just
as the rules of baseball ensure the game’s coherence. This vision is steadfastly
dialectical. The judge’s role is constrained, in ways both concrete and amorphous,
but when the judge does act, discharging his full responsibility requires interpretive
courage, a certain boldness of spirit. And it is precisely this capacity for
boldness—as judges parse the ultimate meaning of law—that renders constraint
necessary in the first place. A similar dynamic governs the political branches. As
players, they are, in an obvious sense, empowered. But the rules also constrain
them. Far from being above the law, in Chief Justice Roberts’s story, they are
precisely subordinate to it. And it is their subordination—the assurance that
lawmakers will stay within their constitutional bounds—that sustains their
empowerment.
Eventually, however, the conceptual symmetry between judge and lawmaker
gives way to judicial supremacy. As I read Chief Justice Roberts’s narrative, there
can be no doubt that it is judges, not political actors, who yield the true, lasting
power. This power is not boundless. It is not the power of value creation, as
160
But see Fried, supra note 16, at 642–45 (arguing that Roberts may be right about
the lack of public interest in umpires, but the analogy applies poorly to judges—especially
Supreme Court Justices—whose behavior we often remember, celebrate, denounce, and
“[go] to the game to see”).
161
See, e.g., Jayson Stark, The Pop-Up Heard ‘Round the World, ESPN (Oct. 7, 2012,
9:35 AM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/playoffs/2012/story/_/id/8467979/mlb-infield-fly-rule-c
all-tarnishes-st-louis-cardinals-nl-wild-card-win (discussing an arguably botched inflield
fly rule call in a playoff game between the Cardinals and Braves). For further legal
discussion of the Infield Fly Rule, see Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly
Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474 (1975); Howard M. Wasserman, The Economics of the
Infield Fly Rule, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 479.
162
Cf. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 248–
49 (1984) (arguing that there are two kinds of activities in constitutional law: the “normal
science” of applying the law and responding to the theoretical requirements of legal
conceptions).
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lawmakers possess. It is the power of referees: formally expansive, but
circumscribed by an ethic of servitude. Chief Justice Roberts’s narrative poses the
United States government—organ of political power par excellence—against the
ethereal clout of law. Confronting the latter, the former’s majesty “recede[s]” in
“deference.” 163 The sovereign slinks away, overwhelmed by law’s force. It is no
accident that Chief Justice Roberts punctuates his narrative with a parable about
Soviet Russia and the “wonderful rights” that its constitution “purported” to
grant. 164 This cautionary tale exemplifies the danger of pure politics: a world of
lofty promises that are, at base, “empty” 165 because their effectuation is left up to
the goodwill of rulers. The lesson is clear. In the absence of oversight,
governments cannot be trusted to act responsibly. Unmoored from law, politics
becomes tragicomedy.
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in United States v. Stevens 166
poetically reminisces about this point. 167 In Stevens, the Court held that a
California statute designed to ban depictions of animal cruelty was
unconstitutionally overbroad because it reached run-of-the-mill commercial
productions, like hunting videos. 168 After enumerating all of its substantive
arguments, the government, in a last-ditch effort to save the statute, also offered up
the following defense: even if the statute is overbroad, “[t]he Executive Branch
[has] construe[d] [the statute] to reach only ‘extreme’ cruelty,” and that it “neither
has brought nor will bring a prosecution for anything less.” 169 Of this, Chief Justice
Roberts makes short, icy work. The purpose of the First Amendment, he writes, is
to “protect[] against the Government,” not to “leave us at the mercy of noblesse
oblige.” 170 An unconstitutional statute does not transform just because the
government “promise[s] to use it responsibly.” 171
In fact, as though more proof were necessary, Chief Justice Roberts notes that
when the animal cruelty statute was first enacted in 1999, the Executive Branch
offered a different promise of how its prosecutorial discretion would be
exercised—namely, only when “depictions of wanton cruelty to animals [were]
designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex” 172—a historical fact that casts
serious doubt on the limiting power of the executive’s new, more expansive,
163

Roberts Hearing, supra note 122, at 56.
Id.
165
Id.
166
130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
167
See id. at 1588.
168
Id. at 1588, 1602. In this vein, Chief Justice Roberts was especially concerned
about the narrowness of the statutory exceptions. For a given act of expression to be
exempt, in addition to having “serious value,” it would also have to “fall within one of the
enumerated categories. Much speech does not. Most hunting videos, for example, are not
obviously instructional in nature, except in the sense that all life is a lesson.” Id. at 1590.
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Id. at 1591.
170
Id. (emphasis added).
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Id.
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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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bounds of self-regulation. Indeed, for Chief Justice Roberts, the most natural
inference to draw from the government’s protestation “that it will apply §48 far
more restrictively than its language provides” is precisely that it makes the statute
constitutionally worrisome. 173 This contention is etched with the same sensibility
as Chief Justice Roberts’s story about the Soviet constitution. They depart from an
equivalent type of skepticism toward political power: a right means nothing if it
can be revoked at will; those who hold political power cannot be trusted; and it is
judges, therefore, who must ensure the meaning of rights by enforcing—which is
to say, serving—the law.
I daresay this all clashes rather sharply with the typical reception of the judgeas-umpire view. That view is undoubtedly conservative, if the term is intended in a
literal sense, to mean reverent of existing institutions, deferential to tradition, and,
in a certain sense, idealistic about what the rule of law can and ought to mean.
These particular conceits, however, are not unique to Chief Justice Roberts. They
are not even unique to the judicial right. They voice a commitment that many
lawyers and judges share—I should think almost all of them—despite hailing from
quite different ideological backgrounds and walks of life. Of course, agreement
about the first-order proposition that judges should act with comparative modesty,
and should be mindful of interpretive constraints, entails quite little about secondorder questions of judicial ideology. To be committed, formally, to judicial
supremacy is not necessarily to embrace any particular constitutional vision;
judges on the left as well as the right can sincerely marshal rule of law rhetoric to
their cause. 174 And just like the civics lessons that bookend many of Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinions, this is where the real interpretive work begins, not where it
ends.
At the same time, it would be inaccurate to say that Chief Justice Roberts’s
narrative commitment to judicial supremacy lacks force. It is a formal claim, yes,
but its form is also meaningful. In an age of widespread demystification, against
the backdrop of calls for minimalism, 175 and for inter-branch dialogue, 176 to insist
on the separation of law and politics is a refreshing, even radical, statement of
orthodoxy. In Chief Justice Roberts’s words, umpires—judges—play a “critical”
role in the system of American government. 177 Even this, however, is an
understatement. Their role is more than critical. It is sacrosanct. It does not just
guarantee the functioning of the system. It promises something more fragile and
harder fought: legitimacy.
173

Id.
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 6 (1997); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
And it is along these lines, of course, that most of the disputes with Chief Justice Roberts’s
analogy have actually fallen. See supra Part II.A.
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See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 25–30 (2005).
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See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: The Constitution in 2020 in
THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 6 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
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III. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS
So far, we have examined two data points: Chief Justice Roberts’s civics
lessons and his umpire metaphor, both of which shed light on his formal
understanding of what it is to judge—and presumably, on his self-understanding as
a judge. The data points, moreover, displayed the same dialectical pattern. In each,
law emerged as simultaneously limited and limiting, and the judge emblematized
constraint in two senses at once. On the one hand, a judge’s interpretive acts unfold
within the finite boundaries of law. This dynamic is captured in the idea of “calling
balls and strikes” and reflected in the codas with which Chief Justice Roberts
occasionally ends his opinions, lamenting law’s inability to account for a greater
share of the normative world. On the other hand, a judge’s interpretive acts also
serve an important constraining function. This idea is captured in Chief Justice
Roberts’s valorization of the ideal that power is ultimately accountable to law (and
the role that umpires play in safeguarding that ideal), as well as Chief Justice
Roberts’s chalkboard lessons emphasizing the bounds of constitutional structure.
In this final Part, I confront the overarching question that has motivated the
inquiry from the start: How does Chief Justice Roberts’s conception of the judge
map onto his actual jurisprudence? Is it possible, beginning from the formal picture
drawn so far, to reach any conclusions or make any predictions about Chief Justice
Roberts’s substantive commitments? This question has lingered, in some form,
ever since Chief Justice Roberts arrived on the Court. But the last two terms have
lent the question newfound urgency. Cutting to the chase, my answer is that Chief
Justice Roberts’s appreciation of constitutional structure—and similarly, his
specific view of the judicial role—do inform his jurisprudential philosophy.
Specifically, they cause him to approach federalism cases in a more “liberal”
manner and to vote against the tide of his broader legal principles in cases with
particularly straining facts.
Chief Justice Roberts is not an automaton: there would be little sense in
suggesting that he is only motivated by principle or that he never comes under the
sway of ideology. He also occupies a singular institutional role, one that
undoubtedly requires him to keep track of pragmatic considerations even in cases
where he might be naturally inclined otherwise. But we do Chief Justice Roberts a
disservice by pretending that his jurisprudence is straightforward. At a more
granular level, it is anything but.
A. His Conservative Median
To begin, I think it safe to say—if it even needs saying—that Chief Justice
Roberts is emphatically not a judicial moderate, much less the new swing
Justice. 178 In Linda Greenhouse’s apt and evocative phrase, Chief Justice Roberts
178

Buzz to this effect began to surface after the NFIB ruling. See, e.g., Editorial, A
Moderate Ruling With Risks Ahead, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/06/29/opinion/the-medical-care-ruling-risks-ahead.html?_r=0#commentsContainer.
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is “conservative to his bones,” 179 a supposition plainly borne out by his voting
record. As a statistical matter, Chief Justice Roberts joins his conservative
colleagues in approximately 90% of cases. 180 Indeed, NFIB is the only opinion—
one of about four hundred—in which Chief Justice Roberts has broken path from
all four of his conservative colleagues in a 5-4 split. 181 By way of contrast, in the
same timeframe, Justice Thomas and Justice Alito have accomplished this feat
three times, 182 and Justice Scalia, twice. 183
What is more, Chief Justice Roberts has become the manifest champion of a
number of conservative causes. One is election speech. Chief Justice Roberts takes
a strong—almost categorical stance—on free expression in general. He has written
for the Court in a number of First Amendment cases, 184 including Snyder and
Stevens, both discussed above, and he has joined multiple speech decisions over
the dissent of his conservative colleagues. 185 Unlike the Court’s liberals, however,
179

Greenhouse, Mystery, supra note 7.
See Stat Pack for October 2011 Term, SCOTUSBLOG at 20, http://sblog.s3.amazon
aws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_OT11_Updated1.pdf (last
visited Jan. 5, 2014); Stat Pack for October 2010 Term, SCOTUSBLOG at 19, http://sblog.s
3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SB_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf (last visited
Jan. 5, 2014).
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Amanda Cox & Matthew Ericson, Siding with the Liberal Wing, N.Y. TIMES (June
28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/06/28/us/supreme-court-liberal-wing5-4-decisions.html?ref=supremecourt.
182
See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2154–55 (2013); CSX Transp., Inc.
v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (2011); Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 557
U.S. 404, 406–07 (2009). Justice Thomas has also parted from the conservative minority.
For cases in which Justice Alito parted from the conservative minority, see Oregon v. Ice,
555 U.S. 160, 162 (2009); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 83
(2007); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 4 (2007).
183
See Cuomo v. Clearing House Assn., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2714 (2009); Spears v.
United States, 555 U.S. 261, 261 (2009) (per curiam).
184
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1212 (2011); United States v. Stevens,
130 S. Ct. 1577, 1582 (2010).
185
See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2324,
2332 (2013) (Chief Justice Roberts writing for majority—over dissenting votes from
Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia—to hold that it violated the First Amendment rights of
public health organizations for the government to make federal funding contingent on a
formal antiprostitution stance in anti-HIV advocacy efforts); United States v. Alvarez, 132
S. Ct. 2537, 2541, 2551 (2012). In Alvarez, Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion holding the Stolen Valor Act, which made it illegal to lie about military
service, unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. Id. In so voting, Chief Justice
Roberts parted ways from his three conservative colleagues, who, swerving to defend the
sanctity of military service, criticized the plurality for departing from the longstanding
precedent that factually false speech that serves no legitimate interest is unprotected for
First Amendment purposes. See id. at 2560–63 (Alito, J., dissenting).
What stirred the plurality in Alvarez, however, was the rationale behind affording less
protection to false speech: it is an exception designed to encourage more speech overall,
not a conceptual lever for proscribing speech. See id. at 2545. In this sense, the holding in
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Chief Justice Roberts’s commitment to free expression also extends to corporate
speech. Part I briefly examines Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Citizens United,
which, while only a concurrence, helped set the tone of the Court’s holding. 186
More recently, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court in Arizona Free
Enterprise Club v. Bennett, 187 which reviewed a “matching funds” scheme in
Arizona state elections, entitling nonprivately financed candidates to obtain
matching public contributions for expenditures made by privately financed
candidates in excess of $350,000. 188 Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the
matching funds scheme unlawfully hampered the ability of privately financed
candidates to exercise their First Amendment rights, as the trigger of
counterfunding “[would] diminish[] the effectiveness” of a privately financed
candidate’s speech. 189 This conclusion is noticeably radical. Whereas Citizens
United involved active constraints on speech—the McCain-Feingold Act
prohibited corporations, unions, and other associations from expending money to
express political viewpoints—Bennett rests on a distinct, and more robust, view of
First Amendment harm. On this view, the First Amendment is implicated not only
when a speaker’s expression is constrained, but also when it is diluted by the
speech of others, 190 a proposition that ought to raise eyebrows in a doctrinal setting

Alvarez is very much consonant with Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court in
Stevens, as well as his avowed commitment to the neutral multiplication of speech in
Citizens United. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 373 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (“The First Amendment protects more than just the individual on a soapbox
and the lonely pamphleteer.”). But see Brown v. Merch. Entm’t Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729,
2742, 2746 (striking down a California law that prohibited the sale of violent video games
to minors; Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Alito’s tempered concurrence, which would
have held the statute unconsituitonal on more narrow grounds than the majority).
186
Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts’s contribution to Citizens United cannot be
extricated from the controversial backdrop of the case’s rehearing, which he is rumored to
have orchestrated behind the scenes. See Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited, THE NEW
YORKER, May 21, 2012, at 36, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/05/
21/120521fa_fact_toobin; see also FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 455
(2007); Hasen, supra note 12, at 785–86 (analyzing Wisconsin Right to Life as a precursor
to Citizens United).
187
131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
188
Id. at 2813–18.
189
Id. at 2838 (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 736 (2008)).
190
Depending on one’s first-order understanding of the First Amendment, of course,
this might be no harm at all. See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 750–52 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expounding on the view that campaign
expenditure limits should be analogized to time, place, and manner restrictions, not to
outright prohibitions on speech); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 264 (1976) (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (propounding the initial grievance with the
Buckley Court’s equation of campaign finance limits and speech prohibitions).
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that typically safeguards the “marketplace of ideas” by exalting the proliferation of
speech. 191
Chief Justice Roberts’s race-based equal protection jurisprudence also tracks
politically conservative values. Over his first handful of terms, Chief Justice
Roberts has already demonstrated a steadfast commitment to constitutional color
blindness. He has voted, at every opportunity, to strike down progressive raceconscious policies. 192 And he has also authored two opinions, a separate opinion in
LULAC v. Perry, 193 concurring in part and dissenting in part, 194 and the opinion for
the Court in Parents Involved, 195 which categorically impugn the use of policies
that employ explicit racial labels.
LULAC arose under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Justice
Kennedy wrote for the Court, holding, among other things, that the composition of
certain electoral districts in Texas effectively “dilut[ed]” Latino voting power.196
Chief Justice Roberts concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed, at the
threshold, with the Court’s framing of the question; he embraced Justice
Kennedy’s construction of what section 2 of the VRA demands. 197 But Chief
Justice Roberts cut anchor from Justice Kennedy’s opinion—sharply—as to the
proper application of section 2. 198 In Chief Justice Roberts’s view, the facts, as
found by the district court, made clear that Texas had met its burden under the
VRA, so no violation had occurred. Overall, Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis in
LULAC is measured and staid. It is clear that he disagrees, in a straightforward and
respectful way, with the majority’s assessment of the facts. Toward the end of his
opinion, however, it also becomes apparent that Chief Justice Roberts takes issue
with the whole business—aesthetically speaking, one could say—of section 2
review. His conclusion openly bristles at the thought that something other than the
desire to curb minority vote dilution might be motivating the Court, specifically,
the desire to “rejigger[]” what “mixes of minority should count for the purpose of
forming a majority in an electoral district.” 199 It would understate the point to say
that Chief Justice Roberts finds the latter effort unsympathetic. Describing it as one
191

As Justice Kagan points out in dissent, the scheme under review in Arizona Free
Enterprise Club’s Free Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), in a sense produces
more speech, not less. See 131 S. Ct. at 2830 (Kagan, J., dissenting). In Chief Justice
Roberts’s defense, he does make a compelling case that the “dilution” theory of First
Amendment harm flows analytically from the Court’s precedent in Davis v. Federal
Election Commission, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). See Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2818–24.
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See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 410 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 711 (2007); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664–
65 (2009).
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548 U.S. 399 (2006).
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Id. at 492–511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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Perry, 548 U.S. at 423–43.
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Id. at 492–93 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Id. at 503–08.
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Id. at 511.
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of “divvying us up by race,” 200 he sees the effort, in no uncertain terms, as “a
sordid business.” 201
That was 2006, the Chief Justice’s first term. It portended a longer arc. The
next term, he assigned himself the majority opinion in Parents Involved, which
capitalized on every available opportunity to pillory the “suspect,” “odious,” and
“demean[ing]” 202 aspects of racial sorting and to make clear that in his view, the
federal courts should vigilantly root out and strike down such sorting, whatever
precise form it takes or name it goes by. 203 Love it or hate it, the Parents Involved
opinion is the work of a highly principled exponent of color blindness. Its final
words will surely remain among Chief Justice Roberts’s most recognizable for
decades, perhaps generations, to come: “The way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” 204 For Chief Justice
Roberts, this is the truth that “history”—with an “h” that cries out for
capitalization—“[makes] heard.” 205
But conservative as Chief Justice Roberts may be, conservative is certainly
not all he is. NFIB made this clear enough. The risk of focusing too squarely on
NFIB—unique piece of political theater that it was—is that of obscuring the
broader pattern of dissonance that Chief Justice Roberts’s canon, viewed in the
proper light, puts on display. In this vein, and with the theme of limitation in mind,
I want to suggest that Arizona v. United States 206—another case from the 2011
term, issued just days before the monumental healthcare decision, and largely
overshadowed by it—is far more surprising and reveals more about Chief Justice
Roberts’s true commitments than NFIB does. Having made that point, the Article
closes by arguing (1) that Arizona and NFIB are the cornerstones of a deeper
“federalist streak” in Chief Justice Roberts’s jurisprudence and (2) that both cases
are of a piece with Chief Justice Roberts’s willingness to stake out counterpartisan
positions when context so demands.
200

Id.
Id. It was this sensibility, no doubt, that informed Chief Justice Roberts’s decision
(and perhaps the other conservatives’ decision as well) to strike down section 4 of the
Voting Rights Act. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). See also Northwest
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (an earlier VRA case in
which Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, lays out the architecture of what would
ultimately become his core rationale in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013),
regarding the importance of equal respect for state sovereignty).
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See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 746
(2007).
203
Id. at 732 (“The principle that racial balancing is not permitted is one of substance,
not semantics. Racial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently unconstitutional’ to a
compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial diversity.’”).
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Id. at 748.
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Id. at 746. For a critical take on this particular turn of phrase, see Goodwin Liu,
“History Will Be Heard”: An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville Decision, 2 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 53–54 (2008) (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court in
Parents Involved actually instantiated the legacy of Plessy, not Brown).
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B. Arizona v. United States
The question presented in Arizona v. United States was whether federal law
preempted four provisions of S.B. 1070, Arizona’s well-publicized “antiimmigration” reform. 207 All four provisions were designed, in one way or another,
to empower state officials to enforce the federal immigration laws. They operated
as follows:
§ 2(B): requiring police officers to ascertain the immigration status
of suspects arrested for non-immigration-related crimes; 208
§ 3: making it a misdemeanor, under Arizona state law, for an alien
to fail to comply with federal registration requirements; 209
§ 5(C): making it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to work
or seek employment in the state; 210 and
§ 6: empowering state and local officials to arrest anyone suspected
of committing an offense that makes him or her removable pursuant to
the federal immigration laws. 211
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, held that federal law preempts section
3, section 5(C), and section 6, since they facially “interfere” with federal
immigration enforcement. 212 As for section 2(B), Justice Kennedy reserved the
possibility of an as-applied challenge down the line—should state courts’
interpretation of “ascertainment” requirement end up running afoul of federal
law—but he held the section constitutional on its face.213 Justice Alito concurred in
part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that section 3 was
preempted while section 2(B) was not. 214 But Justice Alito disagreed with the
Court about section 5(C) and section 6, neither of which interfered, in his view,
with federal immigration enforcement.215 Finally, Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas each authored sweeping dissents, both of which would have vindicated the
Arizona law in full. 216
207

Id. at 2497.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2011).
209
Id. § 13-1509 (Supp. 2012).
210
Id. § 13-2928(C).
211
Id. § 13-3883(A)(5).
212
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505.
213
Id. at 2509–10.
214
Id. at 2524 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
215
Id. at 2525. In fact, with respect to section 5(C), Justice Alito argued that a
restriction on aliens’ ability to seek employment fundamentally regulates employment, an
area of governance left to the states, which means that not only does section 5(C) not
interfere with federal law, but it is not even something federal law ought to regulate. Id. at
2530–32.
216
Id. at 2511–22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 2522–35
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Their view rests, in essence, on the
208
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I will return, momentarily, to the substance of these positions. First, I want to
take a step back and consider the options facing the Chief Justice, as he decided
what vote to cast. He had four distinct options:
1. He could have joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion of the Court.
2. He could have joined Justice Alito’s opinion, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
3. He could have written his own opinion, concurring and
dissenting where he saw fit.
4. And finally, he could have signed on to either Justice Scalia’s
or Justice Thomas’s blanket dissents.
To begin with, it is not surprising that Chief Justice Roberts eschewed route
four. The Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas view is certainly not the kind of
narrow, lawyerly opinion to which Chief Justice Roberts is partial. More than that,
Justice Kagan took no part in the case, so the Court was voting as an eight-person
bloc. For Chief Justice Roberts to join Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas would
have left the Court in the equipoise of four versus four, an outcome that would not
have transformed the practical result,217 but that certainly would have provided less
in the way of guidance.
What is more surprising is that Chief Justice Roberts decided against routes
two and three. First, the decision against route three is striking insofar as Arizona
offered Chief Justice Roberts an opportunity to put his personal imprint on a vital
and evolving area of constitutional law. Because it was a preemption case dealing
with four independent provisions of state law, Chief Justice Roberts could have
handpicked which of the Court’s views he wanted to let stand and which he wanted
to retune. In other words, even if Chief Justice Roberts wished for the same results
as Justice Kennedy’s opinion, he had the latitude to shape the rationales for those
results entirely in his image. Second, the decision not to write on his own is
striking because there is precedent for the proposition that Chief Justice Roberts
idea that states have near-infinite latitude to “more effectively” police the borders of the
United States, even if doing so interferes with federal enforcement priorities in practice.
Justice Scalia’s dissent is too vituperative to illuminate much in the way of doctrine. But
Justice Thomas’s dissent is quite clear on the matter: the default rule is in favor of states;
regulations stand as long as they don’t expressly contradict the letter of federal law. See
132 S. Ct. at 2524 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[H]ere, the
Court holds that various provisions of the Arizona law are pre-empted because they
‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.’ I have explained that the ‘purposes and objectives’ theory of
implied pre-emption is inconsistent with the Constitution because it invites courts to
engage in freewheeling speculation about congressional purpose that roams well beyond
statutory text.” (citation omitted)).
217
The Ninth Circuit panel opinion below was virtually identical in result to the
opinion for the Court. See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (differing
from Justice Kennedy’s eventual opinion only with respect to section 2(B)).
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takes a narrower view of preemption, in the arena of immigration enforcement,
than the Court’s liberals. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for Court in Chamber of
Commerce v. Whiting, 218 a 2010 precursor to Arizona that upheld the Legal
Arizona Workers Act of 2007—a law conferring to state regulators the authority to
revoke the business licenses of firms that knowingly hire undocumented
immigrants—as nonpreempted. 219 Finally, it is also surprising that Chief Justice
Roberts decided against route two. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
converge more than any other pair of Justices, approximately 90% of the time. 220
And their minds seem to work similarly: they often band together when
concurring. 221 Second, as I will discuss momentarily, Justice Alito’s view of the
case is crisper, analytically, than the majority’s view. His conception of federalstate interaction with respect to immigration enforcement has the precise style of
narrowness that frequently attracts Chief Justice Roberts’s vote.
But Chief Justice Roberts opted for route one, joining Justice Kennedy’s
opinion for the Court in full. And what Chief Justice Roberts signed on to, in
making that decision, was a broadly deferential view of federal power over the
administration of immigration law, particularly with respect to section 6, the
provision empowering state law enforcement to make arrests based on the
suspicion that an individual has committed a removable offense. Justice Kennedy
theorized the interaction of state and federal law as follows: state governments are
prohibited from granting authority to police officers to enforce the federal
immigration laws if federal law independently restricts the ability of federal
officials to do the same. As Justice Kennedy put it, “Under state law, officers who
believe an alien is removable by reason of some ‘public offense’ would have the
power to conduct an arrest on that basis regardless of whether a federal warrant has
issued,” a state of affairs that would undermine the “discretion” that the federal
government enjoys to steward “the removal process.” 222
The difficulty with this view is that it fails to distinguish—indeed, it rests
precisely on the indistinction—between the content of federal immigration laws
218

131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
Id. at 1973.
220
See Stat Pack for October 2011 Term, SCOTUSBLOG at 20, http://sblog.s3.amazon
aws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_OT11_Updated1.pdf (last
visited Jan. 5, 2014) (reporting that Chief Justice Roberts agreed with Justice Alito in full,
in part, or in judgment in 91% of cases in the 2011 Term); Stat Pack for October 2010
Term, SCOTUSBLOG at 19, http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/S
B_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2014) (reporting that Chief Justice
Roberts agreed with Justice Alito in full, in part, or in judgment in 96% of cases in the
2010 Term).
221
See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1524–25 (Alito, J., concurring); Va. Office for Prot. &
Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1645 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
222
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012); see also De Canas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351 (1976) (outlining the doctrine surrounding “interference” for preemption
purposes).
219
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and the means of enforcing those laws. Justice Kennedy understands preemption
analysis to demand two distinct inquiries at once. First, it requires the Court to ask
if the substance of S.B. 1070 conflicts with the substance of federal immigration
statutes; second, it also requires the Court to ask whether S.B. 1070 in operation
conflicts with the discretionary enforcement prerogatives of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. But the latter inquiry bears little resemblance to traditional
preemption doctrine, which aims to ferret out conflict between the content of state
law and the content of federal law, 223 not to harmonize state law with abstract
“objectives” of federal law224—especially when the latter have to do with political
leanings of the contemporaneous administration, not congressional will. 225
Justice Alito’s opinion crystallizes this point. Justice Alito argues that the
content of the federal immigration laws—whether a given alien is removable or
not—runs perpendicular to the constraints on federal officials’ ability to enforce
those laws, and therefore, the latter does not preclude states from enacting looser
constraints on their own police officers’ enforcement efforts. In Justice Alito’s
words, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, the executive is “requir[ed] . . . to take custody of
criminal aliens”—and he sees no reason why Congress’s decision to lay out a set
of procedures by which federal officers may effectuate that mandate should
diminish the ability of state legislatures to lay out different procedures. 226 Indeed,
while Justice Alito acknowledges that Arizona’s empowerment of state officials to
enforce the immigration laws could encroach on federal power, the point is that
facially, it does not necessarily do so. 227 As Justice Alito sees it, the cooperation of
223

See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009) (noting that preemption inquiry
ought to look to the “substance of state and federal law”).
224
See id. at 588 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Pre-emption analysis should not be ‘[a]
freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal
objectives, but an inquiry into whether the ordinary meanings of state and federal law
conflict.’”). Perhaps more importantly, the inquiry also runs afoul of commonsense: only a
highly counterintuitive construction of the word “interference” would understand a state’s
decision to enforce federal law, when the relevant federal enforcement body has chosen not
to, to interfere with that same body of law. Justice Kennedy’s opinion refers to immigration
law and enforcement, in one monolithic bundle, as the “system Congress chose.” 132 S. Ct.
at 2503–05. But this is far from self-evident, given the politically controversial way in
which the Obama administration has exercised its enforcement power (or more to the point,
not exercised it). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
225
See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2533–35 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[T]he mere fact that the Executive has enforcement discretion cannot mean that the
exercise of state police powers in support of federal law is automatically pre-empted. If that
were true, then state and local officers could never make arrests to enforce any federal
statute because the Executive always has at least some general discretion over the
enforcement of federal law as a practical matter.”). This is certainly Justice Alito’s
strongest argument. He makes a compelling case, analytically, that the distinction between
immigration law and other legal regimes—if there is one—needs to be established on other
grounds than what the majority invokes.
226
Id. at 2533–34.
227
Id. at 2532–35.
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state officials is as likely to bolster federal enforcement efforts as it is to
undermine them. 228 Justice Alito would treat section 6, therefore, just as he—and
the majority—treats section 2(B): kosher on its face, but possibly unconstitutional
in its application. 229
C. A Federalist Streak, and Something More
The foregoing observations, though certainly not fatal to the majority’s view
in Arizona, raise questions about Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to join the
opinion of the Court. Especially in light of the Chief Justice’s own remarks in
Whiting just one term earlier—explicitly rejecting the argument that Arizona’s
licensing regime was preempted for “upset[ting] the balance that Congress [had]
sought to strike” 230—and the ready-made option to sign on to Justice Alito’s more
tempered opinion, the question arises naturally: What was Chief Justice Roberts up
to? We cannot know for sure, of course. It is possible that the Chief Justice thought
it was important, for reasons wholly independent of the case’s substance, to
maintain a united front on the questions presented in Arizona. Given the recent
swell of anti-immigrant sentiment in many border states, perhaps Chief Justice
Roberts wanted to send a clear message that S.B. 1070 should not become a
blueprint for policy elsewhere. But this hypothesis, even if true, is not fully
explanatory. A separate opinion with more cabined conclusions—again, in the
style of Justice Alito’s—could have induced a chilling effect similar to that of the
majority opinion, while providing Chief Justice Roberts with an opportunity to
make his own imprint on the case. It certainly would not have been the first time
that the Chief Justice wrote separately to temper the relatively sweeping
conclusions of a Justice Kennedy opinion. 231
So in closing, let me propose a simpler alternative: Chief Justice Roberts
agrees with the Court’s opinion in Arizona on principled grounds. And for a
straightforward reason: because he takes seriously the proposition that power must
operate within the structural limits—a theme, I have argued, to which he has paid
various forms of homage over the years, and which causes him to take a more
nuanced view toward federalism issues than his conservative colleagues. Arizona
is evidence for this proposition, as is NFIB. But so are a number of comparatively
lower profile cases from the last few terms: United States v. Comstock 232 from the
2009 term, Maples v. Thomas 233 from the 2011 term, and Skinner v. Switzer 234
from the 2010 term. All three are federalism cases in which Chief Justice Roberts
228

Id.
Id. at 2532–35 (Alito, J., concurring).
230
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1983 (2011).
231
See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372–73 (2010) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
232
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
233
132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
234
131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011).
229
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joined the Court’s liberals, over protestation from the conservatives, just as he did
in Arizona: silently but entirely.
United States v. Comstock concerned the scope of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 235 The question presented was whether Congress exceeded its
constitutional authority by deputizing the Department of Justice to civilly confine
sex offenders, after the course of their criminal incarceration, in situations where
the relevant state jurisdiction was unwilling “[to] assume the responsibility for
[his] ‘custody, care, and treatment.’” 236 It was beyond dispute that Congress had
the authority to criminalize the sex offenses in question. 237 The issue under dispute
was whether Congress also had the authority to arrange for civil confinement in
connection with such offenses, after incarceration. 238 Justice Breyer wrote for the
Court, upholding Congress’s exercise of power on a variety of grounds, including
the historical prevalence of “federal prison-related mental-health statutes” 239—
such as those initiating postincarceration confinement in the first place 240—and the
indisputable soundness of the policy objective at stake. 241 Justice Thomas
dissented from this opinion and Justice Scalia joined in part. 242 Justice Alito and
Justice Kennedy both independently concurred in the judgment, expressing
concern about the “breadth” of the majority’s reasoning. 243 Of the conservatives,
Chief Justice Roberts was the only one to fully endorse the opinion of the Court.
Maples v. Thomas concerned federal habeas jurisdiction under AEDPA. 244
The question presented was whether a procedural default is excusable for cause if
it was the result of abandonment by plaintiff’s counsel. 245 Over the course of
eleven years, in a “perfect storm of misfortune,” 246 multiple attorneys juggled Cory
Maples’s death row appeal and ultimately left him to hang in limbo, effectively
leaving Maples without counsel at the time that he missed his filing deadline.247
Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court, holding that the behavior of Maples’s various
attorneys pushed beyond the threshold of ordinary negligence to the realm of
constructive abandonment, thereby providing cause to excuse his procedural
default. 248 This result, in both logic and composition, echoed—and relied on—
235

Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1954.
Id. at 1969 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006)).
237
See id.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 1958.
240
Id. at 1961–62.
241
See id. at 1965 (citing “the sound reasons for the statute’s enactment in light of the
Government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in
federal custody”).
242
Id. at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
243
Id. at 1968 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1965 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244
132 S. Ct. 912, 917 (2012).
245
Id.
246
Id. at 929 (Alito, J., concurring).
247
Id. at 927.
248
Id.
236
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Holland v. Florida, 249 a similar case from the 2009 term, where the Court excused
a procedural default for cause because the plaintiff’s counsel was so negligent in
his lack of response and substantive support that it constituted an “extraordinary
circumstance” sufficient to trigger equitable tolling under section 2244(d) of
AEDPA. 250 Both cases exhibited the same 6-3 composition, with Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kennedy joining the liberal wing. Furthermore, in both cases,
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas dissented, 251 while Justice Alito concurred in the
judgments while substantially limiting their scope (in Maples, by cabining the
facts, 252 and in Holland, by narrowing the legal standard 253). Once again, among
the conservatives, only Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court’s opinion in full.
Skinner v. Switzer concerned federal jurisdiction over a section 1983 due
process challenge to obtain DNA evidence for testing on appeal. 254 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals denied petitioner’s motion to obtain material DNA
evidence after the fact of conviction, finding that he would have been entitled to
the evidence during trial, but the decision not to procure it was a “reasonable trial
strategy” that could not be “second-guessed” on appeal. 255 Petitioner filed a section
1983 action in federal court, seeking to enjoin the district attorney’s office to
furnish the evidence. 256
The Court granted certiorari to determine whether an action for DNA
evidence is cognizable under section 1983 or whether habeas review was the
exclusive relief available to petitioner. 257 Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court,
holding the claim cognizable under section 1983. 258 She reasoned, based on the
Court’s precedent, that section 1983 claims are precluded, and habeas review is the
sole mechanism of review, in cases where succeeding on the section 1983 claim
would “imply the invalidity” of the incarceration itself. 259 In this case, by contrast,
a successful section 1983 claim would only result in petitioner’s ability to use
DNA evidence during appeal; it would not invalidate his incarceration. 260
249

130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
Id. at 2563–65; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006). Among other outrageous
examples of the counsels’ misconduct, petitioner Holland performed correct legal research
while in prison, which he then used to notify his attorney of filing deadlines—only to
receive no response at all.
251
See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2569 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Thomas, J., as to
all but Part I); Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 929 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252
Id. at 928–29 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the holding in Maples effectively
produces no precedent due to the rarity of the facts).
253
130 S. Ct. at 2568 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that equitable tolling under
AEDPA should only be triggered if petitioner can show that counsel was “not operating as
his agent in any meaningful sense of that word”).
254
131 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2011).
255
Id. at 1295 (citing Skinner v. State, 293 S.W.3d 196, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).
256
Id.
257
Id. at 1293.
258
Id. at 1298.
259
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
260
Id. at 1293.
250
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Therefore, the claim should proceed in federal court. 261 Chief Justice Roberts
joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court without comment. 262
My aim is certainly not to imply that Chief Justice Roberts is a dyed-in-thewool federalist. When it comes to deference to state courts under AEDPA, 263 for
example, or to the Eleventh Amendment, 264 the Chief Justice has no bleeding heart
for the federal courts or the federal government. At the same time, his views on
federal-state relations are significantly more nuanced than those of his conservative
colleagues. And this, I have to think, is no accident.
Chief Justice Roberts holds constitutional structure in the highest regard. His
civics lessons venerate it; his opinions vindicate it. These background observations
might have little predictive power in specific cases. But they do have such power
when it comes to general trends. Take Arizona. Surely it was unknowable in
advance exactly how Chief Justice Roberts’s veneration of constitutional structure
would inspire him to construct each distinct provision of S.B. 1070. But I think it
was foreseeable that Chief Justice Roberts would take a more careful and nuanced
approach than Justice Alito, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas. And it is likewise
foreseeable that in the future, when the equivalent of Arizona comes around—or
the equivalent of NFIB, whatever that quite means—Chief Justice Roberts will
display a capacity for dissidence that his conservative colleagues often lack. 265
261

Id. at 1299–1300.
Of course, it is possible that Chief Justice Roberts’s position in Skinner has little to
do with federalism and, instead, is about the substantive scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This inference, though admittedly possible, is rendered comparatively
implausible by Chief Justice Roberts’s professed view on the matter previously. See Dist.
Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 73–74 (2009) (holding
that there is no due process right to obtain DNA evidence at a postconviction hearing). In
keeping with the theme of conservative Justices breaking rank from their colleagues, it also
bears note that Justice Scalia joined the opinion of the Court in Skinner.
263
See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 769 (2010) (denying federal appeal under
AEDPA on the grounds that the Supreme Court of Michigan had not applied the Sixth
Amendment unreasonably); Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1714–23 (2007)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing against a federal appeal on the grounds that federal law
was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, making deference to state
courts under AEPDA required ipso facto). Compare Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309,
1315 (2012) (Chief Justice Roberts joining the Court to hold that a procedural default is
excused under AEDPA if the state appellate system structurally prohibits defendants from
raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a timely manner), with Trevino v.
Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1922–23 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Martinez
should not be extended to cases where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not
structurally prohibited, but only “highly unlikely”).
264
See, e.g., Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1645–51
(2011) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a suit against the State of Virginia by an
independent state agency, seeking to secure federal funding for disabilities programs,
should be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds).
265
Chief Justice Roberts’s capacity for dissidence also seems distinct from—but
worth comparing to—Justice Kennedy’s capacity for the same, which is not so much
dissident as irresolute: making a style out of ambivalence. See generally Reva B. Siegel,
262
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Along these lines, I want to make one final observation about Chief Justice
Roberts’s concern for the law’s boundaries. In cases where justice seems to have
miscarried due to extreme or idiosyncratic facts, Chief Justice Roberts is willing to
arrive at “liberal” outcomes in response. In Graham v. Florida, 266 for example,
Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the Court that in the specific case of Terrance
Jamar Graham—convicted of armed robbery, which he committed as a minor, and
during which no one was harmed—the sentence of life in prison without parole
was unconstitutionally harsh. 267 At the same time, however, Chief Justice Roberts
emphatically disagreed with Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that the sentence of life
without parole for nonhomicide offenses, as applied to juveniles, categorically
violates the Eighth Amendment. 268 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts concurred only
in the Court’s judgment, with an analysis carefully tethered to the particular
circumstances of Mr. Graham’s case. 269 Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts made quite
explicit that in a different case—for example, that of “Milagro Cunningham, a 17year-old who beat and raped an 8-year-old girl before leaving her to die under 197
pounds of rock in a recycling bin”—he would be happy to uphold the sentence of
life without parole, despite the nonhomicidal nature of the offense. 270 But on the
specific facts of Graham, he was not.
A second example is Cone v. Bell, 271 a federal habeas case with the same vote
split as Graham. In Cone, the Court had to decide whether petitioner’s claim that
witness statements had been suppressed gave rise to a Brady claim sufficient to
obtain federal habeas review under AEDPA. 272 The case had been dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on the theory that the Tennessee Supreme
Court’s rejection of petitioner’s appeal had rested on independent and adequate
grounds in state law. 273 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens reversed and
remanded, arguing that petitioner had properly preserved and exhausted his Brady
claim in state court, meaning that it was not waived for federal habeas purposes.274
Chief Justice Roberts concurred, stipulating in the first line of his opinion that
Cone “is grounded in unusual facts that necessarily limit its reach.” 275 In particular,
Chief Justice Roberts thought the case had a “unique procedural posture,” since the
Brady claim was “neither barred under state rules for failure to raise it nor
Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117
YALE L.J. 1694 (2008) (analyzing the contours of Justice Kennedy’s avowed interest in
“dignity” and examining how it pulls in competing directions at once). The Chief Justice,
by contrast, has clear commitments; they just get easily lost in the noise.
266
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
267
Id. at 2036–37 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
268
Id. at 2036–38.
269
Id. at 2039.
270
Id. at 2041.
271
556 U.S. 449 (2009).
272
Id. at 451–52.
273
Id.
274
Id. at 452.
275
Id. at 476 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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[previously] decided in the state system.” 276 Inasmuch, Chief Justice Roberts
joined the Court’s holding—unlike Justice Alito, Justice Thomas, and Justice
Scalia—but he also took care to reiterate that the question presented on remand is a
“fact-specific determination” about whether the suppressed witness statements are
material, per Brady, to the petitioner’s death sentence. 277 In Chief Justice Roberts’s
view, Cone ought to hold no more than that. 278
In both of these cases, Chief Justice Roberts’s role is hesitant, and his legal
conclusion narrow: perhaps to the point of singular. Just like the federalism cases
discussed above, and like the civics lessons and umpire metaphor examined in
previous Parts, these cases make it difficult to predict how Chief Justice Roberts
will respond to specific cases in the future. But they make it easy—almost
unassailable—to conclude that he responds with an admirable openness toward
specific factual circumstances and doctrinal settings. Sensitive to limits, skeptical
of overreach, and painfully aware of what law, in spite of its better nature, cannot
accomplish, Chief Justice Roberts is certainly a judicial conservative. The point is
simply that the story of his tenure cannot be left there.
In close, perhaps the best way to summarize Chief Justice Roberts’s approach
to the judicial post is in his own words. Consider Armour v. Indianapolis, 279 a 2012
case presenting the question of whether it violated the Equal Protection Clause for
the City of Indianapolis to charge particular residents thirty times more than others
for the same plumbing services, due to an administrative idiosyncrasy. 280 Justice
Breyer, writing for the Court, held that it did not. 281 Departing from the principle
that “[a]s long as the City’s distinction [between residents] has a rational basis, [it]
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause,” 282 Justice Breyer argued that the
unequal treatment was justified by “administrative considerations.” 283 Refunding
the money, on top of being difficult and potentially costly, also ran the risk of
engendering resentment among residents—perhaps to the point of inspiring further
lawsuits—in connection with other city projects. 284 For these reasons, Justice
Breyer, applying rational basis review, upheld the City’s decision.
276

Id.
Id. at 477.
278
Id. at 477–78.
279
132 S. Ct. 2073 (2012).
280
Id. at 2077.
281
Id.
282
Id. at 2079–81. This is a noticeably lenient principle. In Justice Breyer’s words, all
that is needed is a plausible reason for the law, and “there is such a plausible reason if
‘there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.’” Id. at 2080 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313
(1993)).
283
Id. at 2081.
284
Id. at 2082 (“Finally, the rationality of the distinction draws support from the fact
that the line that the City drew—distinguishing past payments from future obligations—is a
line well known to the law. Sometimes such a line takes the form of an amnesty program,
involving, say, mortgage payments, taxes, or parking tickets.”).
277
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Chief Justice Roberts dissented, remarking with some dismay that in this area
of law, “[the Court’s] precedents do not ask for much from government . . . only
rough equality.” 285 Indeed, for Chief Justice Roberts, many of the City’s
arguments—for example, that it would be “administratively difficult” to issue
checks to the aggrieved residents, or that the City could not provide recompense
because it has already spent the money 286—did not merit the proverbial time of
day. They “[gave] euphemism a bad name.” 287 Nor did the majority’s
administrative deference theory fare better. “The Court,” Chief Justice Roberts
wrote, is “willing to concede that administrative considerations could not
justify . . . an unfair system in which a city arbitrarily allocate[s] taxes among a
few citizens while forgiving many others on the ground that it is cheaper and easier
to collect taxes from a few people than from many.” 288 But to what end? For Chief
Justice Roberts, this concession was “[c]old comfort,” since, if “the [arbitrary
allocation] language does not accurately describe this case,” he was “not sure what
it would reach.” 289 Finally, the Chief Justice also balked at the Court’s assurance
that Armour, like its predecessor Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Commission of Webster County, West Virginia, 290 is a “rare case” and ought to be
less worrisome for it. 291 For Chief Justice Roberts, the shortcoming of this view
could hardly be clearer: it is precisely the rare cases, in which the violations are
clearest, that ought to disturb us most intimately. Or in his words:
The Court reminds us that Allegheny Pittsburgh is a “rare case.” It is and
should be; we give great leeway to taxing authorities in this area, for
good and sufficient reasons. But every generation or so a case comes
along when this Court needs to say enough is enough, if the Equal
Protection Clause is to retain any force in this context. Allegheny
Pittsburgh was such a case; so is this one. Indiana law promised
neighboring homeowners that they would be treated equally when it
came to paying for sewer hook-ups. The City then ended up charging
some homeowners 30 times what it charged their neighbors for the same
hook-ups. The equal protection violation is plain. 292
285

Id. at 2087 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (“The Court wisely does not embrace the City’s alternative argument that the
unequal tax burden is justified because ‘it would have been fiscally challenging to issue
refunds.’ . . . One cannot evade returning money to its rightful owner by the simple
expedient spending of it.”(citations omitted)).
287
Id.
288
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
289
Id.
290
488 U.S. 336 (1989). In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, the Court held that a
municipal government violated the Equal Protection Clause by assessing taxes of thirtythree times greater magnitude on one parcel of property than it assessed on equivalent
parcels in the region. Id. at 343.
291
Armour, 132 S. Ct. at 2087.
292
Id.
286
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Rare interventions; measured tones; the wisdom to know when the right case
has, indeed, come along. The rule of law is very often no more than this. But it is
this—and in Chief Justice Roberts’s hands, sublimely.

